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This dissertation is an analysis of Spinoza's claim

that there is only one substance (proposition XIV, Ethics

)

.

The various problems arising from, and interpretations of,

that claim are examined.

themselves:

These issues concern the arguments

their conclusions, whether the conclusions

prove what Spinoza thinks they prove, and perhaps most
importantly, certain key concepts of Spinoza ("attribute",
"substance", and "essence") embedded in the premises of
the arguments

By careful examination it is found that most of

Spinoza's arguments for the claim that there is only one
substance in the universe are either problematic or defective

.

The main obstacle to Spinoza's claim is not

what is commonly thought, that is, the De Vries problem,
"but

rather the arguments themselves.

All the arguments

examined are found to include very problematic premises.

Spinoza is unable to satisfactorily prove either that,
1) one substance cannot be produced by another substanc

or 2) that there cannot be two self -caused infinite sub

stances.

Since both of these claims are necessary to

establish proposition XIV, he is unable to support it.

VI
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PREFACE
"How is it possible," thought the emperor, "that

what they see so clearly
wise men?

Am

I

cannot see at all?

Are they

I a fool?"'*"

Although flagrant disagreement exists among commentators concerning Spinoza's views on substance and attributes,

all proclaim that given Spinoza's definitions and axioms,
the derivation of his central tenet (that there is exact-

ly one substance), is as obvious as the emperor's famous

new clothes.

My vision is not so clear.

In the secondary literature on Spinoza there is, as

far as I have discovered, very little critical discussion
of Spinoza's claim that there is only one substance in the

universe

.

We are informed that he held the view that there

is only one substance, but never fully presented with an

analysis of Spinoza's arguments for this thesis, or any
critical evaluation of the arguments-

Consequently, when

commentators tell us that Spinoza believed there is but
one substance in the university, it is not at all clear what
is being ascribed to Spinoza, nor what the premises are

which led Spinoza to such a conclusion.
Y~.

Hans C. Anderson, "The Emperor's New Clothes," from
Fairy Tales trans E. V. Lucas (New York: Grosset
& Dunlap, 1967), 239
,

.

*

Vlll

The present study is an attempt to present a coherent

analysis of Spinoza's claim that there is only one substance.
Unlike other commentators,

critically examine various pro-

I

blems arising from, and interpretations of, that claim.
Specifically, this study examines various issues that arise

from an examination of three arguments Spinoza employs in
support of this claim.

These issues concern the arguments

their conclusions, whether the conclusions

themselves:

prove what he thinks they prove

,

and perhaps most impor-

tantly, certain key concepts of Spinoza ("attribute",

"substance", and "essence") embedded in the premises of
the arguments

In Chapter I, a discussion and brief exploration of the

problems in three arguments for the conclusion that there
is only one substance is presented.

Spinoza’s definition of "attribute", and a consideration of various interpretations and problems with that definition, is presented in Chapters II and III.
In Chapter II,

I

examine whether Spinoza thinks of

the attributes as "subjective" (having no reality outside
the perceiving intellect), or whether he thinks of them as

"objective" (having a reality outside the perceiving intellect).

A consideration of, and arguments against,

the

views of two Spinoza scholars (H. A. Wolfson and G. H. R.
Parkinson) is given here.

I

conclude Chapter II by offering

IX

my own reasons for the "objectivist" position.

(Later

I

show that Spinoza can consistently claim both that the

attributes have a reality outside the perceiving intellect
and that there is only one substance

.

Spinoza's notion of "essence" is discussed in Chapter III.

First,

I

define what an essence is for Spinoza,

and then attempt to discover whether Spinoza's "essence"

resembles what is commonly meant by that term.
a distinction by A. Plantinga,

is,

Employing

ask whether an essence

I

for Spinoza, something that "uniquely individuates"

whatever has it, or whether it is simply what is called
an essential property.

Three conflicting statements by

Spinoza on this issue are given, and three possible solutions to this apparent inconsistency are offered.

I

then

show that the adoption of the third solution is preferable
to either of the others since it allows Spinoza to hold

that there is only one substance

,

and that substance has

an infinite number of attributes
In Chapter IV, I consider Spinoza's definition of

"substance", focusing on interpretations of, and problems

relating to, that definition.
substratum view of a substance.

I

ask if Spinoza holds a

Specifically, it is

queried whether a substance is a substratum which supports
all the qualities inhering in it, or something else en-

tirely

.

X

In the first part of Chapter V an important objection
to Spinoza raised by Simon De Vries concerning the apparent

inconsistency between the oneness of substance and the multiplicity of the attributes is presented.

Second,

pre-

I

sent one of Leibniz' objections to Spinoza's definitions
of "substance” and "attribute" and consider the various

problems this objection raises for Spinoza.

Third,

I

pre-

sent E. M. Curley's thesis about substance and its attri-

butes and show how his thesis is related to both the Leibniz and De Vries problems.
In the first part of Chapter VI a critique of E

.

M.

Curley's proposed solution to the problem raised by Leibniz is offered.

I

show that Curley's thesis about substance

and its attributes is mistaken.

My own interpretation of

the problems raised by Leibniz and De Vries is then presented.

In summary, Chapter VII utilizes the discussions in

Chapters II through VI to further explore the difficulties

present in Spinoza's claim that there is only one substance.
My interpretation of the three arguments in Chapter

given.

I

I

is

also consider the truth of the premises, and whe-

ther the considerations Spinoza offers in support of his

conclusions are sufficient to support them.

1

CHAPTER

I

SPINOZA'S ARGUMENTS FOR ONE SUBSTANCE

Spinoza's statement of the claim that there is only
one substance in the universe comes in proposition XIY

Part

I

of the Ethics and reads

Besides God no substance can be granted
or conceived....
As God is a being absolutely infinite, of whom no attribute
that expresses the essence of substance
can be denied (by Def vi ) and he
necessarily exists (by Prop, xi ) if
any substance besides God were granted,
it would have to be explained by some
attribute of God, and thus two substances
with the same attribute would exist, which
(by Prop, v.) is absurd; therefore, besides
God no substance can be granted, or, conseIf it could be conquently, be conceived.
ceived, it would necessarily have to be
conceived as existent; but this (by the
first part of this proof) is absurd.
Therefore, besides God no substance can
be granted or conceived.
.

.

.

Spinoza's argument in support of proposition XIV has three
separate parts, none of which independently supports proIn order to demonstrate that there is only

position XIV.

one substance in the universe Spinoza argues:

(1) There

must be at least one substance, (2) one substance cannot
produce or cause another substance, and (3) there cannot
be two self-caused substances.

1.

B. Spinoza, Ethics

Inc., 1955

)

,

5^-55*

trans

Spinoza argues for claim (1)
R. H. Elwes

(New York: Dover

2

in proposition XI Part
to show that "God,

I

of the Ethics where he attempts

or substance, consisting of infinite

attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite

essentiality, necessarily exists." 2

arguments for claims

(

2

)

and

(

3

)

I

present Spinoza's

as follows:^

(2) One substance cannot be produced by another

substance (Prop, vi )
Hence, there cannot
a self-caused infinite
be two substances:
substance which produces a created finite
.

substance

ARGUMENT A.

(Reductio)

1.

Suppose there are two substances
A and B, such that A causes B.

2

Things which have nothing in common
cannot the one be the cause of the
(Prop. Ill)
other.

.

3-

A and B must have something in
common.
(1,2)

4.

Two substances whose attributes are
different have nothing in common.

(Prop. II)
5

.

A and B must share the same attri-

bute
6.

7

.

(3 >4

.

There cannot exist in the universe
two or more substances having the
(Prop. V)
same nature or attribute.
A and B cannot share the same

attribute.

2.

3

.

(

6

)

I do not discuss proposition XI
Spinoza, Ethics 51.
in this dissertation, for the proper treatment of this
requires a separate paper
,

Material for Arguments A through D from Spinoza, Ethics
45 ff.

3

8

©

.

5,7

There cannot he two substances A
and B, such that A causes B.

9-

ARGUMENT B.
1.

(Reductio)

Suppose there are two substances
such that A causes B.

A and B,

.*.

2.

The knowledge of an effect depends
on and involves the knowledge of
a cause.
(Axiom IV)

3

Knowledge of B depends on and
involves knowledge of A.
(1,2)

•

4.

Substance is that which is in
itself and conceived through itself; in otherwords, a conception
of it can be formed independently
of any other conception.
(Def. Ill)

5

•

B must be in itself and conceived
through itself.
(1,4)

6

.

7

•

8

.

9

.

If B is conceived through itself
then knowledge of B cannot depend
on knowledge of A.
(Def. Ill)

Knowledge of B cannot depend on
(MP 5,6)
knowledge of A.

©

3,7

There cannot be two substances A
and B such that A causes B.

(3) There cannot be two self-caused substances
there cannot be two gods).
( i .e
.

,

ARGUMENT C.
1.

(Reductio)

Suppose there are two substances, A
and B

4

2

Every substance is necessarily
infinite.
(Prop. VIII)

.

A is infinite and B is infinite.

3-

(

1 2
.

)

4.

The more reality or being a thing
has the greater the number of its
(Prop. IX)
attributes.

5

A has infinite attributes and B
has infinite attributes.
(2,4
and Def. VI)

•

If A possesses infinite attributes
then A possesses all possible attri(Def. VI and Prop. XIV
butes.
Book I, "No attribute that expresses
the essence of substance can be de-

6.

nied.")
7.

If B possesses infinite attributes
then B possesses all possible attri(Same as above)
butes.

8.

A possesses all possible attributes.
(MP 5,6)

9

.

B possesses all possible attributes.
(MP 5,7)

10.

A and B possess the same attribute.
(8,9)

11.

There cannot exist in the universe
two or more substances having the
(Prop. V)
same nature or attribute.

12.

A and B cannot possess the same
(11)
attribute.

13.
14.

(x)

10,12

There cannot be two substances,
A and B

5

As can be seen from the above proofs, the derivation
of the oneness of substance is far from obvious.

remainder of this chapter

I

shall examine individually

certain problematic premises in arguments A and
pointing out the problems in premises
ment A and premise

In the

2,

B,

briefly

4 and 6 in argu-

in argument B.

2

The primary purpose here is to show that without an

understanding of the key concepts ("attribute", "essence"
and "substance") in Spinoza, one cannot begin to compre-

hend the premises embedded in the various arguments.

Consider premise 4 (proposition II) of argument A:
"Two substances whose attributes are different have no-

thing in common."

The proof for this proposition is:

For each must
Evident from def. iii
through
conceived
be
and
itself
exist in
conception
the
words,
itself; in other
of the one does not imply the conception of the other.
.

Supposedly, from Spinoza’s definition of "substance" this

proposition follows

•

An examination of this proposition

raises the following questions:

Does the definition of

"substance" alone yield proposition II?

What does Spinoza

mean by the phrase "have nothing in common"?

Are the

attributes the only things that two substances could
possess in common?
TT.

Spinoza. EthicsT 4 7

.

6

It is difficult to perceive how proposition II follows

from Spinoza's definition of "substance".

In order to get

the desired conclusion as it stands, Spinoza must have

some suppressed premise (s) in mind.
is:

One possible premise

If two substances share a similar attribute then the

conception of the one substance involves the conception
of the other (P

Q)

.

By definition a substance cannot

involve the conception of anything else (~Q).

The con-

clusion that follows from this is that two substances
cannot share a similar attribute (^P).

clusion Spinoza reaches in proposition
II.

This is the conV,

not proposition

Were this Spinoza's argument proposition V would

simply be a restatement of proposition II.

But proposi-

tion II does not appear to state what proposition V asserts.

Proposition II claims that if two substances have

different attributes then they have nothing in common.

It

does not purport to show that two substances cannot have the
same attribute

Furthermore

.

,

it is not clear that Spinoza

would hold that sharing an attribute entails sharing the
If the above is not the suppressed pre-

same conception.

mise of proposition II, it is not at all clear what that
premise might be

.

Nothing Spinoza offers

including his

definition of "substance", yields the desired conclusion.
It would help if we knew what Spinoza means by two things

having nothing in common.

7

In Axiom V Spinoza gives a clue regarding what it

means to say that two things have nothing in common.

Axiom V states:
Things which have nothing in common
cannot be understood, the one by means
of the other; the conception of one
does not involve the conception of
the other.

Proposition II, when filled out in this way, states that
if two substances have different attributes then the con-

ception of the one substance does not involve the conception of the other substance.

If we deleted the phrase,

"whose attributes are different," then proposition II is

trivially true, for it is simply a restatement of the

definition of "substance"

.

Proposition II as it stands

is supposed to be a statement about the nature of not

only a substance, but an attribute also.

Yet,

the defi-

nition of "attribute" is not referred to in the demonstration.

Spinoza attempts to prove something about the attri-

butes, but uses exclusively the definition of "substance".
The phrase,

"whose attributes are different," seems totally

irrelevant to this proposition.

Two substances by defini-

tion have nothing in common, if by that he means the con-

ception of the one does not involve the conception of the
other.

Hence, it is unclear why Spinoza adds the phrase

"whose attributes are different."

5

.

Spinoza, Ethics

,

46.

8

Perhaps the phrase "whose attributes are different"
is purely parenthetical.

In a letter to Oldenburg where

Spinoza discusses this proposition he states:
Things which possess different attributes have nothing in common. For by
attribute I have explained that I mean
something of which the conception does
not involve the conception of anything
else .6
The above quotation shows that attributes, like substances,

are things that do not have anything in common with any-

thing else

.

As such,

the phrase "whose attributes are

different" is simply a qualifying phrase in proposition
II, which adds nothing new to the proposition.

Even if two substances have different attributes, it
still seems possible that they could share similar modifications.

Spinoza states in his definitions in Book

I

of

the Ethics that substances possess not only attributes but

modifications.^

Why is it that two substances cannot have

modifications in common?

In otherwords, why, if only

their attributes are different, do two substances have

Spinoza does not allow that the posses-

nothing in common?

sion of a common mode is a sufficient condition for comYet he does seem to al-

monality between two substances.

low that the possession of a common attribute (a common
Spinoza. Correspondence trans R. H. M. Elwes
283(New York: Dover Inc., 1955 )

B.

•

,

»

7.

Spinoza, Ethics

,

45-

9

conception) is a sufficient condition.
he allows the one,

It is unclear why

yet disallows the other.

If inodes are

not the kinds of things that can he shared he should give
some argument to that effect, or offer some explanation

for why this cannot he the case.
There are other problems with this proposition.

It

is unclear in the phrase "whose attributes are different"

how we are to understand "attributes"

There are two dif-

.

ferent interpretations that can be given to this phrase.
One interpretation is the following:

substance.)
Ax &

~Ay)

(Let Sx = x is a

(x)(y)(Sx & Sy & (3A)(A is an attribute &
=>

x has nothing in common with y)

.

On this in-

terpretation, if two substances differ with regard to some

attribute they then have nothing in common.
ever,

interpret the above phrase quite differently, as

follows:
& Ay)

One could, how-

=5

(x)(y)(Sx & Sy & ^(3A)(A is an attribute & Ax
x has nothing in common with y).

On this inter-

pretation, if two substances differ with respect to all
their attributes then they have nothing in common.

In the

first interpretation it is only necessary for the substances
to have some attribute that differs in order for the claim

that they have nothing in common to be true

.

In the second

interpretation the substances have nothing in common if
and only if all of their attributes differ.

which interpretation is correct.

It is unclear

Without a better

10

understanding of the important terms "substance" and
"attribute" we cannot begin to understand proposition II.

Consider premise

2

(proposition III) of argument A:

"Things which have nothing in common cannot the one be the
cause of the other."

The proof to this proposition is:

"If they have nothing in common, it follows that one can-

not be apprehended by means of the other (Axiom V) and,
therefore, one cannot be the cause of the other (Axiom IV)."®
This argument is a reductio and can be represented as fol-

lows

:

ARGUMENT D.

(Reductio)

1.

Suppose there are two things A
and B such that A has nothing in
common with B and A causes B.

2

Things which have nothing in common
cannot be understood the one by
means of the other.
(Axiom V)

.

8.
3-

B cannot be understood by means
of A.
(1,2)

4.

If B cannot be understood by means
of A then knowledge of B does not
depend on or involve knowledge of A.

5

Knowledge of B does not depend on
(MP 3»4)
or involve knowledge of A.

•

6.

Knowledge of an effect depends on
and involves knowledge of its
(Axiom IV)
cause.

7

Knowledge of B depends on and
(1,6)
involves knowledge of A

.

.

Spinoza, Ethics

,

47.

11

8.
9*

©

5,7

There cannot he two things A and
B such that A has nothing in common with B and A causes B.

This same proposition is found in the Short Treatise where

Spinoza argues that something cannot come from nothing.
There he states directly that things which do not have in

themselves something of another thing, cannot he the cause
of the existence of that other thing.

g

Proposition VI is

also a restatement of proposition III, and is a more con-

vincing argument.

His argument in proposition VI is that

if a substance were caused hy something other than itself

the knowledge of it would depend on the knowledge of its

cause and hence hy definition III it would not itself
he a substance.

1(^

The reason this argument is more convincing is that

the things in question in proposition VI are substances

which hy definition must he conceived through themselves.
If we grant the truth of Axiom IV ("The knowledge of an

effect depends on and involves the knowledge of a cause."

11
),

then hy definition one substance cannot cause another substance
~9i

Proposition III, as it stands, is a more general

.

Spinoza. Short Treatise on God, Man and his WellBeing, ed. John Wild (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1930),
52
B.

-

10.

Spinoza, Ethics

11.

Ibid., 46.

,

48.

12

statement and does not specify that the things in question
are substances.

Proposition III asserts that when

aiiy two

things, whether they are substances or not, have nothing in

common they cannot cause one another.

Now, according to

Spinoza there are other things besides substances.

Axiom

I

he says,

"Everything which exists, exists either in

itself or in something else."

The things which exist in

themselves Spinoza calls "substances"

.

Spinoza calls the

things which exist in something else "modes".
I

In

("By mode,

mean the modifications of substance, or that which exists

in,

and is conceived through, something other than itself." 1 -^)

Given the above, it appears that proposition III can be applied to modes as well as substances.

Individual physical

objects and thoughts are modes for Spinoza, and physical

objects enter into relations with other physical objects and
thoughts with other thoughts.

Thus bodies are caused by

other bodies and thoughts by other thoughts.

The cause and

effect relation does apply then, not only to substances and
other things, but to modes and other modes.

The only stipu-

lation Spinoza makes about the cause and effect relation is
that it cannot apply to bodies and thoughts.

That is, the

mind has no causal power over the body, nor the body over
"Body cannot determine mind to think, neither

the mind.

12

.

13-

Spinoza. Ethics
Ibid.

,

4 5-

,

46

.

13

can mind determine body to motion or rest or any state dif-

ferent from these, if such there be." 1 ^

Taking "things"

in proposition III to be modes we get:

Two things which

are conceived through something other than themselves,

where the conception of the one does not involve the con-

ception of the other cannot the one cause the other
[(X)(Y)(X is conceived through
W & X /

Z&Y/W&W

cause X)].

/

Z

=>

Z

& Y is conceived through

X cannot cause Y and Y cannot

Let X be Bill's happiness,

Z

be the substance

Bill, Y be John's happiness, and W be the substance John. 1 ^

This proposition then states that if Bill's happiness is

conceived through Bill, and John's happiness is conceived
through John (where Bill's happiness is not identical to
Bill nor John's happiness

to

John), and Bill's happiness is

not identical to John's happiness, then Bill's happiness

cannot cause John's happiness.

Surely this is false.

There

is nothing in the antecedent that precludes Bill's happiness

causing John's happiness.
14

.

15.

Spinoza, Ethics

,

1^

131*

This way of making sense of proposition III when filled
out in this manner was suggested to me by Professor Fred

Feldman
16

.

I realize that there is somewhat of a problem in construing the modes in Spinoza's system as accidental
properties (as I will do later on), and talking about
modes causing other modes. It does sound strange to
One
talk about properties causing other properties.
quasi-indivior
states
could think of the modes as
duals, and talk about states causing other states.

14

Oldenburg expresses my puzzlement over proposition
III when,

in a letter to Spinoza, he states:

.your .. .axiom, that when things have
no quality in common, one cannot he produced by another, is not so plain to my
groping intelligence as to stand in need
of no further illumination....
your axioms are not established beyond all
assaults of doubt, [and] the propositions
you have based upon them do not appear to
me absolutely firm. 17
.

.

Spinoza answers Oldenburg by saying:
.it follows that, if two things have
nothing in common, one cannot be the
cause of the other. For, as there would
be nothing in common between the effect
and the cause, the whole effect would
spring from nothing. 18
.

So,

.

Spinoza's further illumination is to state that unless

the effect of some cause has something in common with that

cause (can be conceived through that cause), the effect

springs from nothing.

But surely this does not follow.

It does not follow from the fact that an effect cannot be

The abundance of evidence, however, does point to the
fact that Spinoza thinks of the modes as accidental
properties. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the
same objections to Spinoza's views on causality apply
whether one thinks of the modes as states or as accidental properties. As will become evident, particularly
in the case of modes, there seems to be no good reason
to suppose either that knowledge of an effect depends
upon and involves knowledge of its cause, or that a
cause necessarily implies its effect.
17.

Spinoza, Correspondence

18.

Ibid.

283.

,

280-281.

15

conceived through its cause, that therefore, that effect
has sprung from nothing.
It is crucial that we get a clearer understanding of

what Spinoza means when he states that two things have

nothing in common.

So far all we have ascertained is that

if two things have nothing in common they cannot he con-

ceived through one another.

But what does it mean to say

things have nothing in common?

One possible way of under-

standing this clause is the following:

common with Y
Z

& Y has Z).

=

X has nothing in

^(3Z)(Z is a mode or an attribute & X has
In otherwords, two things have nothing in

common when there is neither an attribute nor a mode that
they share.

This interpretation is supported by Spinoza's

statement
Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the other, either by the
difference of the attributes of the substances, or by the difference of their
modifications .19

On this interpretation, proposition III states that things

which have neither a mode nor an attribute in common cannot the one be the cause of the other.

I

will take this

to be the correct interpretation of proposition III since

it seems the most plausible.

Argument D then, is Spinoza

s

argument for the conclusion that things which share neither
attributes nor modes cannot cause one another.
19

.

Spinoza, Ethics

,

^7

16

Returning to Spinoza's argument
seen that the argument is valid.

D,

it can easily be

But the truth of some of

the premises (for example premise 6) rests upon the accep-

tance of some very dubious assumptions.
IV) of argument D,

Premise

(Axiom

6

together with Axiom III ("From a given

definite cause an effect necessarily follows..." 20 ), is an

explicit statement of Spinoza's belief that the causal relation is a logically necessary relation of implication;
that is, a cause necessarily implies its effect.

In pre-

mise 6 Spinoza also makes an epistemological claim.

Spino-

za claims not only that a cause necessarily implies its

effect, but that we cannot know an effect without knowing
its cause.

("The knowledge of an effect depends on and in-

volves the knowledge of a cause."

)

Spinoza's claim that there is a necessary connection

between any cause and its effect is at the very least a
Prior to Hume it was commonly thought

questionable claim.

that this was the case
of its effect.

— that

a cause compels the occurence

Hume argued that there is in fact no such

necessary connection.

He argued that we can without con-

tradiction easily imagine any cause without its effect.

Although they might be conjoined they are not connected.
With Hume, and against Spinoza,
20

.

21.

Spinoza, Ethics
Ibid.

,

46

I

think that the idea of

17

any cause is perfectly separable from its effect, and hence
there is no necessary connection between a cause and its

effect
Furthermore, Spinoza's epistemological claim in premise 6 of argument D seems false.

It seems perfectly con-

sistent to claim knowledge of an effect without knowledge
of its cause.

A counter-example to this claim can be found

in the area of medicine.

There are many diseases (effects)

for which we do not know the causes, yet it makes sense to

say we know the effects (the diseases).

We can, without

contradiction, make the statement that we know the effects
of many unknown causes.

Of course, it can be argued that

we cannot know it is an effect without knowing it is the

effect of some cause.

The notion of an effect only makes

sense in reference to the notion of a cause.

not Spinoza's claim in premise 6.

But, this is

His claim is that with-

out knowing the cause of a certain effect we cannot know

that effect.

This clearly seems false.

Suppose, however,

that Spinoza is not claiming that we cannot in any sense

know the effect of some cause without knowing the cause,

but rather that we cannot fully or totally know the effect.

Spinoza would then be claiming that you cannot have full
knowledge of a thing without knowing its cause

certainly a more plausible claim.

.

This is

Whether this claim is

true depends upon what is meant by "full" knowledge of a

18

thing.
it?

22

Does this mean everything there is to know about

It seems a criterion as strict as this would
prevent

us from ever knowing anything.

It is unclear how we are

to understand premise 6 in argument D.

Without a better

understanding of this premise, the soundness of Spinoza's
argument

(

to show that two things having nothing in common

cannot the one cause the other) cannot be established.
These are the preliminary problems with premise

(proposition III) of argument A.

2

Further problems with

this premise will have to await the discussion of Spinoza's

notions of "substance" and "attributes" in the chapters

which follow.
Consider premise

6

(proposition V) of argument A:

"There cannot exist in the university two or more substances

having the same nature or attribute."

The proof for this

proposition is:
If several distinct f distinctae l substances be granted, they must be distinguished distingui l one from the
other, either by the difference of
their attributes, or by the difference
of their modifications (Prop. iv.).
If only by the difference of their
attributes, it will be granted that
there cannot be more than one with an
If by the difidentical attribute
ference of their modif ications--as
1

.

22.

Spinoza holds that a true idea or thought is selfevident. As such it would seem that in Spinoza's
own system knowledge of the cause of these true
thoughts is not necessary for knowledge of the true
idea

19

substance is naturally prior to its
modifications (Prop. i.),--it follows
that setting the modifications aside,
and considering substance in itself,
that is truly, (Deff. iii and vi )
there cannot be conceived one substance
different f distingui l from another, -that is (by Prop, iv ) there cannot
be granted several substances, but one
substance only. 2 3
.

.

.

The first thing to be noticed about the above proof is

that it does not prove the proposition it is intended to
prove

.

The proof given as the proof for proposition V is

not a proof for the conclusion that no two substances can
have the same attribute, but rather a proof for the conclu-

sion that there is only one substance

.

Spinoza does not

even attempt to prove proposition V, but simply asserts that
it will be granted that there cannot be more than one sub-

stance with an identical attribute

.

This is apparently so

obvious to Spinoza that it needs no further illumination.

From the fact

Yet once again the obviousness eludes me.

that X and Y are substances that are distinct but have an

attribute in common, we are supposed to arrive at a contradiction.

But what is the contradiction?

Is there some-

thing about the notion of "attribute" that precludes there

being two substances with an identical attribute?

In order

to answer this question it is necessary to turn to the defi-

nition of the term "attribute".
23

.

Spinoza, Ethics

,
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Before

I

do,

however, there

20

is one more problem with the proof to proposition V that

should be mentioned.

Spinoza seems to commit a fallacy in

the proof to proposition V
the word

word

"

"

The fallacy consists in using

.

distinc tae ” in two quite different senses.

The

distinctae " can mean either qualitatively distinct

or numerically distinct.

Spinoza uses it in both senses.

In the premise he is talking about substances which are

qualitatively distinct, whereas in the conclusion he asserts

numerical distinction.

Spinoza makes the assumption that

the same content cannot belong to a plurality of substances,

and from that he derives the conclusion that there cannot
be a plurality of substances of the same nature

.

The whole

proof to proposition V seems to be based on this play of

words
In order to understand what proposition V asserts it
is necessary to determine Spinoza's definition for the term

"attribute".

He defines "attribute" as,

"...that which

the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of

substance."

24

/

.

(The important question of whether an attri-

bute really does constitute the essence of substance will
be discussed in Chapter II

.

)

Given that an attribute is

supposed to constitute the essence of substance, it is

necessary that we know how Spinoza defines the word "essence".
24

.

Spinoza, Ethics

,

45
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Spinoza does not define "essence" until Part II of the

Ethics

There "essence" is defined as follows:

.

consider as belonging to the essence
of a thing that, which being given, the
thing is necessarily given also, and
which, being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also; in other words, that
without which the thing, and which itself
without the thing, can neither be nor be
conceived 25
I

.

Both the terms "attribute" and "essence" are crucial in an
analysis of proposition V.

These terms will be thoroughly

discussed in Chapters II and III.

All

I

wish to point out

here are some preliminary problems with these terms and the

propositions they are supposed to support.
One preliminary problem has already been mentioned.

That is, we are never given any proof of proposition V.
is supposed to be self-evident.

self-evident.

It

Yet it is far from being

Now that we have the definitions of "attribute"

and "essence" proposition V should become clearer, and
indeed at first sight it does become clearer.

Given the

definitions of "attribute" and "essence", proposition V
That is, it appears to follow from

does seem to follow.

the definition of "attribute" that,

if two substances pos-

sess the same attribute then they would possess the same

essence

.

In this case there would be no reason to speak

of them as "two", for they would be indistinguishable,

25*

Spinoza, Ethics

,

82.
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not distinct

i_L§_jL>

.

This issue, unfortunately

complicated than it first appeal's*

,

is much more

To begin with,

it is not

at all clear from Spinoza's definition of "essence" that if
two substances share an attribute then they share the same

essence

.

It could be that sharing an attribute means shar-

ing an essential property, and it does not follow from this

that the substances in question would be the same substances.
This proposition would be much more plausible if we under-

stood Spinoza to mean by "same nature or attribute" that
no two substances can share all their attributes and be dis-

tinct.

For if two things share all of their properties,

then by Leibniz' Law they are identical.

But in the proof

to proposition V Spinoza says that there cannot be more than

one substance with an identical attribute

from clear why this cannot be the case.

,

and it is far

Again we are left

in the dark without a better understanding of the terms

"attribute" and "substance".
This concludes the preliminary discussion of some of
the problems with Spinoza's arguments for the conclusion

that there is only one substance in the universe.

Follow-

ing is a discussion of the terms embedded in the various

arguments (and related problems), which are necessary for
an understanding of proposition XIV

23

CHAPTER

II

ATTRIBUTES
Perhaps the most perplexing, and certainly the most
discussed, problem in Spinoza scholarship is the determi-

nation of the status

(

i .e

,

the "subjectivity” or "objec-

tivity") of the attributes of substance.

Determination of the status of the attributes has important consequences for many of Spinoza's claims, particularly for his claim that there is only one substance in
the university.

The problematic character of this issue arises from
the different translations, and hence interpretations, that

can be given to Spinoza's definition of "attribute". Therefore,

the only way to clarify this ambiguity is by examining,

directly and thoroughly, his definition in the original Latin text.

Spinoza defines the term "attribute" as follows:

Per attributum intelligo id, quod
intellectus de substantia percipit,
tanquam ejusdem essentia constituens.
[By attribute I understand, that which
the intellect perceives of substance,
as constituting its essence.]!

XT

Benedicti De Spinoza, Opera I, J. Van Vloten et
P. N. Land, MCMXIII, Apud Martinum Nijhoff, 5^
English translation mine
J.
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There are two basic positions advanced concerning the

meaning of this def inition--traditionally referred to as
the "subjectivist" versus the "ob jectivist" position.
To examine each "subjectivist's" and "ob jectivist s"
'

interpretation of this definition is beyond the scope of
this paper.

The purpose of clarification can be accom-

plished by an examination of how certain representative
"subjectivist" and "ob jectivist" scholars interpret this

definition and the reasons for their respective interpretations.

I

shall first present the "subjectivist" and

"ob jectivist" positions without clarification.

Then

I

shall attempt to clarify and critically examine their

positions.

My own interpretation of Spinoza's definition

will emerge in this discussion.
The "subjectivists" make the following claims about

the attributes:

1)

They argue that Spinoza thinks of the

concepts we have of the attributes of God as inventions of
the human mind.

Ideas of God's attributes are simply con-

ceptions we form of the essence of substance, or God, from
the way in which the substance appears to us in our experi-

ence

They are simply mental constructs, or forms of cog-

.

nition.

2) The human mind, according to the "subjectivists",

is incapable of achieving any real knowledge of God or sub-

stance

.

3) The concepts we form of the attributes of sub-

stance are not true characterizations of substance.

In

25

otherwords, our ideas of the attributes of substance do

not have a correlate in reality, or to use Spinoza's terminology, the ideas of the essence of substance

(

i .e

.

,

the

ideas of the attributes) do not correspond to the ideatum
(

i'6-

i

the object of the ideas).

Using a terminology that

both Descartes and Spinoza employ, one could say that the

"subjectivists" argue that the "objective reality" (the

attributes as they are presented to us by our ideas of
them) has no corresponding "formal reality"

(

i .e

,

our ideas

have no correspondence to the essence of substance itself).
As is evident from the three claims presented above,
the "subjectivists" are making both ontological and epis-

temological claims.

They not only claim that the attributes

have no reality apart from the perceiving mind (similar to

Berkeley's view), but that as "mental constructs" they provide us with no knowledge of substance itself.
The "ob jectivists"

,

on the contrary, maintain that our

concepts of the attributes do correctly characterize the
essence of substance.

That is, our ideas of substance do

correspond to the ideatum
"formal reality"

.

,

the "objective reality" to the

They further argue that the human mind

can and does have knowledge of substance or God.
is,

(That

this "correspondence" between idea and object is one

that is evident.)

The

"ob jectivists" agree with the

"subjectivists" that it is the intellect that perceives

26

the attributes.

They disagree, however, that what is

perceived by the intellect has no corresponding ideatum

.

The "objectivists" argue that the attributes are both

perceived by the intellect and present in substance as its
essence

will attempt to further clarify and evaluate the

I

"subjectivist"/"objectivist" positions after the presentation of these positions by representative advocates.
H. A. Wolfson,

a "subjectivist", points out that two

very different interpretations can be given to Spinoza’s
definition of "attribute", depending on which part of the
definition one stresses.

If one emphasizes the expression

"which the intellect perceives", the definition may be

taken to state that the attributes of substance have only
"mental existence" and do not correctly refer to the pro-

perties of substance itself.

If, however,

one stresses

the phrase "constituting the essence of substance", it

seems that the attributes really exist outside the mind,
in res

,

and are the things out of which the essence of sub-

stance is composed.

Wolfson states this in the following

passage
If the expression "which the intellect
perceives" is laid stress upon, it
would seem that attributes are only in
Attributes would thus be
intellectu
only a subjective mode of thinking, expressing a relation to a perceiving
subject and having no real existence
.

27

in the essence.
On the other hand,
if only the latter part of the definition is taken notice of, namely,
"constituting the essence of a substance," it wuld seem that the attributes are extra intellectum real elements out of which the essence of the
substance is composed. 2
,

Wolfson chooses the "subjective" interpretation, and therefore stresses the phrase,

"which the intellect perceives."

According to Wolfson, what we think of as the attributes
of God are only inventions of the mind--mental entities--

with no real existence in substance itself

or,

for that

matter, in any existent thing outside the mind.

Our con-

cepts of the attributes are only a subjective mode of
•

-3

•

thinking, expressing a relation to a perceiving subject.

Wolfson'

s

"subjective" interpretation of Spinoza was

originally proposed by Erdmann.

Erdmann feels that the

attributes are not really properties of a substance, but
rather "forms of cognition" in the human subject.

Accord-

ing to Erdmann, the attributes are inventions of the human

mind which are set up in order to constitute a means of
conceiving the substance

Our concept of the attributes

.

is simply a subjective device with the implication that

they (the attributes) have no place in God or substance
2.

The Philosophy of Spinoza Vol.
1^6
Schocken,
1969)
York:
H. A. Wolfson,

*

3

•

Ibid

I

(New
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at all.

Unlike Platonic "forms” which are abstract but

not necessarily "subjective", Erdmann feels that Spinoza's

attributes are both "forms of cognition" and necessarily
"subjective".

God, according to Erdmann,

unknowable in Spinoza's system.

is absolute and

Since God is unknowable,

neither our ideas of God's attributes, nor anything else
can provide us with any real knowledge of God's essence or
nature.

Wolfson develops Erdmann's interpretation and

attempts to trace Spinoza's thought to his medieval predecessors

.

There are many reasons why Wolfson holds a "subjective"

interpretation of the attributes.

The most important rea-

son is his belief that Spinoza’s thought is very closely

akin to certain medievals like Maimonides

.

Seeing Spinoza

so closely related to the medievals, Wolfson finds support

for the "subjective" interpretation in the medieval assertion that God is unknowable.

Wolfson states, "The God

or substance of Spinoza, like the God of the medieval ra-

tionalists, is unknowable in His essence.""’

Elsewhere he

states
.Spinoza has adopted the traditional
term "attribute", and makes use of it
.

lf~.

5

-

.

This discussion occurs in Wolfson, Spinoza Vol. I,
146-147, and is there attributed to J. E. Erdmann (Ed.),
Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, II, 272.6.
Ibid.

,

142.
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as a description of the manner in
which substance, unknowable in itself, manifests itself to the human mind .6

Wolfson offers as textual support for his view two passages
from the Correspondence

.

The first passage reads:

"...the

existence of God is His essence, and of His essence we can

form no general idea..."'7

The second passage that Wolfson

refers to is a section from one of Spinoza's letters to

Simon De Vries, where Spinoza attempts to elucidate for
De Vries the nature of an attribute.

This very interesting

passage reads as follows:
.by Israel is meant the third patriarch; I mean the same by Jacob, the
name Jacob being given, because the
patriarch in question had caught hold
of the heel of his brother.
Secondly,
by a colourless surface I mean a surface, which reflects all rays of light
without altering them. I mean the same
by a white surface, with this difference,
that a surface is called white in reference to a man looking at it, &c .8
.

.

Wolfson sees this passage as support for the "subjective"
interpretation of the attributes.

The surface is called

white relative to a man's perception of it.

So it is with the

attributes--they are relative to our perceptions of them.
Spinoza Vol.

Z~.

Wolfson

7.

Spinoza, Correspondence

8

Ibid

.

.

,

,

316

.

I,
,

145

•
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Their existence depends on perception, and they are real

only in the sense that someone perceives them as real.
W.

As

Teo has pointed out, for Wolfson the attributes "...seem

to be something like colored glasses.

What a man perceives

through the particular glasses he happens to be using at
the time would be considered a substance.

Wolfson

concludes, "...it is not as a mere turn of speech that

Spinoza always refers to attribute in subjective terms...
[for it] is called attribute with respect to the intellect." 10

Wolfson offers two further reasons for a "subjective"

interpretation of the attributes.

One reason is that he be-

lieves there are other passages in Spinoza which support
this view.

For example, in proposition XII in Part

the Ethics Spinoza states,

I

of

"No attribute of substance can

be conceived from which it would follow that substance can

be divided."

11

Wolfson claims that this passage supports

the "subjective" interpretation.

He says,

While the definition of attribute
states affirmatively the subjective
nature of attributes by declaring
that they are only perceived by
the mind, the proposition [XII)
"The Relation of Substance to Attributes
in Spinoza," Kinesis 1, Fall 1968, 17.

W. K. Teo,

10.

Wolfson, Spinoza Vol.

11.

Spinoza, Ethics

,

5^*

I,

152.
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denies any independent reality to
attributes by which the simplicity
of the substance would be endangered .12

Wolfson feels that if the attributes of a substance are
really present in the essence of the substance, then the
simplicity of the substance would be destroyed.

He can

see no way that the attributes can be real within a simple

substance

.

Also, according to Wolfson, if the "subjective" inter-

pretation is maintained we can eliminate the problem raised
by such scholars as Martineau, who states, "How that essence
can be one and self-identical, while its constituents are
many, heterogeneous and unrelated, is a question which is
13
hopeless of solution." v

Wolfson is pointing to the problem,

originally raised by De Vries, of the apparent contradiction

between the plurality of the attributes and the fact that
there is only one substance.

There is no contradiction,

according to Wolfson, if the attributes of the one substance
are simply inventions of the human mind.

This is the "subjectivist" interpretation of the attri-

butes in the words of its most representative advocate, H.
A. Wolfson.

12

.

13-

Wolfson, Spinoza Vol. I, 156.

Martineau, A Study of Spinoza (London: Macmillan,
1882), 185

J.

•

32

As demonstrated through the examination of Wolf son

and Erdmann, the "subjectivists” make three claims:

1)

Our concepts of the attributes of God are inventions of the

human mind, "mental constructs" or "forms of cognition."
2) The human mind cannot know substance or God.

3) Our

concepts of the attributes do not have correlates in substance itself

.

I

shall argue against all three of the

"subjectivist" claims in what follows.
First, it is unclear what the "subjectivists" mean

when they say that our concepts of the attributes are inventions of the human mind, or "mental constructs."

I

have interpreted this to mean that our concepts of the

attributes are simply conceptions we form of the essence of
substance from the way in which substance appears to us in
our experience.

I

realize, however, that this does not

offer much clarification.

The terminology is obscure.

Second, the claim that our ideas of the attributes do

not correctly characterize substance (claim 3) is supposed
to follow from both claims 1 and 2.

The "subjectivists" think that from the claim that

our ideas of the attributes are "forms of cognition" or

"mental constructs" (claim 1), it follows that our ideas

cannot correctly characterize substance.

This is mistaken.

Even if we grant that our ideas of the attributes are
"mental constructs," nothing whatsoever follows about the
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status of the attributes as true or false charac teriza—
tions of substance

•

It is possible for them to be "inven-

tions of the human mind" and to refer correctly to the

essential properties of substance.
The "subjectivists" must apparently also think that

from the epistemological claim that the human mind cannot
know substance or God (claim 2), the ontological claim that
our concepts of the attributes have no corresponding ideata
(claim 3) follows.

follows:

This argument might be represented as

(A) If our concepts of the attributes correspond

to the essence of substance itself, then God or substance

for Spinoza is knowable

Spinoza is unknowable.

.

(B) But,
(C)

God or substance for

Therefore, our concepts of the

attributes do not correspond to the essence of substance
itself

Even if we grant the claim that God for Spinoza is
unknowable

(a

claim

I

do not grant),

premise A is false.

Our concepts of the attributes of substance can both corres-

pond to the essence of substance as it is in itself (the

ideatum ) and substance can still be unknowable.

That is,

there could be an accidental correlation of our ideas of
the attributes of God with those attributes as they are in

substance itself (with His actual properties), and yet we
have no way of knowing this

34

The "subjectivists" also seem to feel that it follows

from claims

1

and

2

together that our ideas of the attri-

butes do not correctly characterize substance itself.

They

think it follows from the fact that our ideas of the attri-

butes are "inventions of the human mind," together with the
fact that the human mind cannot know substance or God, that

therefore an idea of an attribute does not have a correspond
ing ideatum

(

i .e

.

,

does not correspond to the essence of sub

stance as it is in itself).

claims

1

and

2

But all that follows from

is that there is no way of knowing whether

our ideas of the attributes really capture the real essence
of substance

.

It does not follow that our ideas of the

attributes dn not capture the real essence of substance
The "subjectivists",

claim 3.

therefore, have no argument for

It is possible for our ideas of the attributes to

be "inventions of the human mind," for God to be unknowable

and yet for an idea of an attribute to have a corresponding

ideatum

.

Further, if we understand the "subjectivist" claim
to be the claim that the only reality the attributes of

substance have is in the mind, or in our idea of them, then
it seems that they are attributing to Spinoza the view that

substance is what has been called a "bare particular."
this view when the perceiving mind is not present, the

attributes also are not present, although substance is

On

35

left intact, that is, intact as an undifferentiated,

attributeless "bare particular."

When Wolf son says that

substance is, "...absolutely simple, free from accidental
as well as from essential attributes..." 1 ^

attributing the above view to Spinoza.

he seems to be

As will be shown

in Chapter IV, no such view can be attributed to him.

Also,

this seems inconsistent with Wolf son's claim that we cannot

know what substance is

.

is "absolutely simple,"

able

For how can we know that substance
if substance is said to be unknow-

.

Third,

the claim that for Spinoza the human mind cannot

possibly know substance or God is false.

Spinoza repeatedly

claims that the finite mind can have an adequate knowledge
of God through the attributes that it does understand.

noza states in the Correspondence

thoroughly know God, but that

I

attributes,

I

"
,

.

.

.1

Spi-

do not assert that

understand some of His

...and... my ignorance of very many does not

hinder the knowledge

I

In the Ethics he

have of some

states, "The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the

eternal and infinite essence of God."
"

.

lk

.

.

1^

He also declares,

.the infinite essence and the eternity of God are

Wolf son. Spinoza Vol.

I,

15.

Spinoza, Correspondence

16.

Spinoza, Ethics

,

118.

,

116

387-
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known to all." 17
"

•

.

In the Short Treatise Spinoza says,

.here we speak only of attributes which might be

called ’proper attributes' of God, through v/hich we come
to know Him [as He is] in Himself..."

Spinoza suggests

here that our ideas of the "proper attributes"
I

(by which

understand him to mean extension and thought),

us God as He is in Himself.

do

show

These and other quotations

offer conclusive evidence against the premise in the

"subjectivist" argument which states that the human mind

cannot know God or substance

Further arguments in the Short Treatise support the
claim that Spinoza believes the human mind can and does
Our ideas of the attributes cannot only be mis-

know God.

leading inventions of the human mind.

The perception of the

attributes must have as its source the objective presence
of the attributes in substance

Spinoza tells us that neither the existence nor the
essence of anything ever depends upon us.

therefore see now that the truth, essence, or existence of anything never
From what has been
depends on me
said so far it is clearly manifest that
the idea of infinite attributes in the
perfect being is no fiction... 19
I

.

17

.

Spinoza. Ethics

,

.

118.

18.

Spinoza, Short Treatise

19.

Ibid.

,

47-48.

,

59-
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This is clearly an explicit rejection of

position.

"the

"suh jectivist"

In this same passage Spinoza goes on to ask how

we arrive at the idea of infinitely many attributes in a

substance
And whence comes this idea of perfection? This something cannot be the
outcome of these two [attributes]:
for two can only yield two, and not
an infinity. Whence then? From myself, never; else I must be able to
give what I did not possess. Whence
then, but from the infinite attributes
themselves which tell us that they are,
without however telling us, at the same
time, what they are:
for only two do
we know what they are .^0
Here Spinoza explicitly says that we cannot invent the ideas
of the attributes, because we do not have it within our power
to do so.

Ideas of the attributes, he argues, must come from

a reality outside the intellect, namely in the infinite at-

tributes themselves.
Also, Wolf son's "subjective" interpretation cannot be

sustained by passages where Spinoza says that the attributes
are distinguished from substance by the intellect.

For it

does not follow from the fact that the intellect perceives
the attributes, that therefore the distinction which the

intellect perceives is not real.

Wolfson places a mistaken

emphasis on the relation of the attributes to the intellect.
It is not the case that for Spinoza anything perceived by

20.

Spinoza, Short Treatise

,

48.
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the intellect is necessarily "subjective".

As Parkinson

has pointed out, 21 Spinoza states in the Ethics

,

"Reason

perceives this necessity of things truly--that is, as it

m

is

itself."

22

Spinoza further states that, "The order

and connection of ideas is the same as the order and con-

nection of things."

23

As a matter of fact, even Wolf son

seems to contradict his own position and give support to
the "objectivist" view when, in talking about proposition
XI

,

he says

Starting therefore with the definition
of attribute as "that which the intellect perceives of substance, as if constituting the essence of substance" and
assuming it to be a true proprium of
substance, Spinoza concludes... 2 ^
[Underlining mine
.

So, although Spinoza holds that it is the intellect that

perceives the attributes, it is not the case that what the
intellect perceives is of necessity subjective.

Our ideas

of the attributes are not mere "as ifs" through which we

approach an ultimately unintelligible being.

Attributes

are not posited by the intellect as belonging to a sub-

stance which in actuality is without them.
TT.

Although

Parkinson, Spinoza's Theory of Knowledge
(Oxford: Clarendon Press 1954 )» 85*

G.

R.

H.

,

22.

Spinoza, Ethics

23.

Ibid

24.

Wolfson, Spinoza Vol.

,

,

117-
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I,
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Wolf son's interpretation does not lack "an exegetical
pedigree"

(M.

S.

Gram), his representative subjectivist

view is mistaken.
The "ob jectivists" also question Wolf son's view

that the attributes are "subjective".

Marjorie Grene

for example, wonders if our ideas of the attributes through

which we are to understand God or Nature are "mere 'as-ifs'
through which we approach an ultimately unintelligible ground
or being," or whether they refer to independent entities in

their own right.

^

Three representative scholars of the

"ob jectivist" position are G. H. R. Parkinson, E. Powell

and H. Joachim.
G. H.

R. Parkinson views the problem of attributes as

He feels that those like Wolf son, who

one of translation.

have taken a subjective view, have simply mistranslated
one of the words in Spinoza's definition of "attribute".
The word Parkinson thinks has been mistranslated is the

Latin word
in Latin

"

"

tanquam "

.

As Parkinson correctly points out,

tanquam " can be rendered as either "as" or "as if".

Parkinson feels that those who have taken a "subjectivist"

position have translated
of "as”

.

"

tanquam " to read "as if" instead

Parkinson feels that if we translate the defini-

tion of "attribute" as, "that which the intellect perceives
25

.

Grene. ed.. Spinoza (New York: Anchor Press, 1973

M.

xi

.

)*
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constituting the essence of substance," instead of "that

as_

which the intellect perceives as if constituting the essence
of substance," we would no longer be inclined to think, of the

attributes as subjective.
late

"

Parkinson claims that to trans-

tanquam " as "as if" involves a misconception of Spi-

noza's view of the nature of the intellect.

noza's passage in the Ethics which states:
ceives this necessity of things truly
itself." 27

— that

He quotes Spi-

"Reason peris,

as it is in

Based on this quotation Parkinson concludes that

the attributes are not mere "subjective modes of perception."
E. Powell,

like Parkinson, argues against the "subjec-

tive" interpretation of the attributes.

An interesting

aspect of Powell's interpretation is that he makes use of

precisely the same passage in Spinoza to demonstrate his
"ob jectivist" position that Wolfson takes as evidence for
the "subjective" view.

The passage Powell and Wolfson refer

to is that quoted previously, where Spinoza attempts to show

how two things may properly be called by two names.
refer to page 29, footnote 8.)

(Please

As seen previously, Wolf-

son takes this passage as support for the view that the

attributes are relative to our interpretation of them.
26

.

Parkinson, Spinoza's Theory

27*

Spinoza, Ethics

28.

Parkinson, Spinoza's Theory

,

,

85

,

85-

117*

pQ

4l

Powell interprets this passage very differently.

He agrees

that at first reading the passage does sound very much like
the language of phenomenalism.

He claims,

however, that,

It is certain that Spinoza never aims
to he a phenomenalist he is always in
intention a thorough-going realist.
Knowledge for him is knowledge of reality in the most literal sense of the term
.an interpretation of the passage in the
sense of conscious and express phenomenalism, would place it in sharp contradiction
with the tenor and complexion of his whole
;

.

.

system .29
Powell goes on to give his reading of the passage

.

He

thinks this passage conveys Spinoza's belief that although

"attribute" and "substance" may be distinguished in thought,
they cannot be separated except by the intellect.

In ob-

jective reality the attributes never exist distinct from

substance.

He states:

Attribute and substance cannot be separated, though they may be distinguished
These cannot be separated
in thought...
any more than Israel and Jacob, or than
the whiteness of the plane and the plane
But they may be distinguished in
itself.
thought, attribute refering to substance
in its qualitative aspect, just as "Jacob"
applies to Israel, though refering especially to the patriarch's posture at
birth .30
29

30

.

.

E. Powell, Spinoza and Religion (Chicago: Open Court
Co., 1906), 119.

Ibid.
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This is obviously a very different interpretation than the
one Wolf son presents.

For Powell, the attributes are ob-

jectively real, as real as substance itself, for in reality a substance and its attributes are one and the same

thing.

This is a very interesting view of the relationship

between a substance and its attributes, a view which will
be discussed at much greater length in Chapter VI, where

Curley's interpretation of Spinoza is considered.
be seen,
H.

(As will

Curley is in agreement with Powell on this issue.)
Joachim, an "ob jectivist"

,

takes a slightly dif-

ferent approach than Parkinson or Powell.

Joachim argues

that Spinoza can consistently claim both that a substance
has an infinite number of attributes, and that each attri-

bute is identical with the substance
"

.

.

.

The attributes are

.ultimate characteristics of reality, in the sense that

11
neither can be reduced to the terms of the other.

And,

substance is the same in each attribute, since each attribute expresses what substance is.

32

On the face of it this interpretation is self-contra-

dictory.

To hold that a substance is the same in each

attribute and that each attribute is separate from and
irreducible to any other implies that a substance both is
JT.

Joachim. A Study of Spinoza (New York: Russell &
22
Russell, 19^4
H.

)

32.

Ibid.

,

26.

,

.
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is not identical with its attributes

•

Joachim seeks to

avoid this difficulty by saying that the attributes of a
substance appear to be diverse for the intellect.

He feels

that there can be an infinite number of attributes, each of

which expresses totally the essence of substance, while there
is a distinction between one attribute and each of the other

attributes as they appear to the perceiving intellect.
this way he feels the contradiction is removed.

In

He is not

saying that a substance is both identical and not identical
to its attributes.

Rather, the perceiving intellect per-

ceives substance differently as it perceives the different

attributes it has.

As such, it is not substance, but our

view of substance in relation to each of its attributes,

which is different.
As M. Gram points out, Joachim recognizes two rela-

tions involved in the substance/attribute relation.

There

is the relation of identity, which holds between a substance

and its attributes apart from any relation it has to the
intellect.

And there is the relation of difference, which

holds between an attribute and a substance as it is known
to the intellect.

33

As textual support for his view, Joachim offers two

passages from the Ethics
333

.

One passage is Spinoza's definition

Gram, "Spinoza, Substance, and Predication,” Theoria
Voi xxxiv, 1968, 229.
M.

.

,
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of "attribute".

Joachim reads this definition as

support for the claim that the attributes are in part

affected by the knowing intellect,
v/

hat the intellect perceives.

i .e

,

an attribute is

That the attributes are also

present in substance, Joachim supports by the part of the

definition of "attribute" which reads, "constituting the
essence of substance," and by Spinoza's proposition that

"nothing is granted in addition to the understanding, ex34
cept substance and its modifications."

Since an attri-

bute is obviously not a modification of substance, accord-

...

ing to Joachim, it must in some sense be identical with

substance.

33
^

for Joachim the attributes are objectively

So,

real, though subjectively perceived.
This is the "ob jectivist" interpretation of the attri-

butes in the words of three of its most representative
advocates.

What

I

will now show is that although the

"ob jectivist" position is in principle correct, the ad-

vocates of this position represented have not properly

interpreted Spinoza.
34

.

35

.

Spinoza, Ethic's

47

,

.

(I realize that the explicaJoachim, A Study 17-18.
tion given of Joachim's view offers little clarificaI think, however, the fault lies not so much in
tion.
my explication, but rather in the fact that his view
makes very little sense or is at the very least extremely obscure )
,

,
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The sub jective/ob jective question cannot be solved

along the lines suggested by Parkinson.

It is not the

case that those who have taken a subjective interpretation
of the attributes have done so because they have mistrans"

lated

tanquam ”

We cannot rely on translation without answering the

subjective/objective question.

The translation of

"

tanquam ”

cannot be used to elicit the correct interpretation of

Spinoza's definition of "attribute".

Without previous

knowledge of the correct interpretation we cannot arrive
at the proper translation.

Those who have taken a "subjec-

tive" position have done so because they have misunderstood
the real nature of the intellect for Spinoza.

what Hampshire warns against:
to their own age

They have done

they have been "...faithful

."'5

"Ob jectivists" like Joachim and Powell also misinter-

pret Spinoza.

For example, Joachim cannot use passages in

Spinoza where Spinoza says that nothing exists except a
substance and its modifications as proof for the "objective"
position.

These passages only state that an attribute is

not a modification of a substance.

They do not tell any-

thing about the relationship that exists between a substance and its attributes.

36

.

Furthermore, as will become

"Spinoza and the Idea of Freedom," in
Hampshire
Spinoza M. Grene ed., 297*
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.

,

,

,
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evident in the chapter on De Vries, the "objective" position of people like Joachim and Powell creates more problems that it solves.

On their interpretation the pro-

blem of how substance can be one and its attributes many
is doubly acute

.

The most fatal flaw, however, to all of the interpre-

tations considered is that they have all assumed incorrectly
that the intellect referred to in Spinoza's definition of

"attribute" is the finite human intellect.

The word

"

in-

tellectus " in Spinoza's definition can refer to two different things.

It can either refer to the "infinite in-

tellect of God" or to the finite intellect of human beings.
The most important difference between the infinite intellect

and the finite intellect is that the latter is limited, and
as such can only conceive two of God's attributes.

Spinoza

compares our understanding with that of a fictitious worm
living in the bloodstream trying to make sense of its

surroundings.

This little worm, he says, would live in the

blood as we live in part of the universe

.

It would observe

the blood, but fail to notice that each drop of blood acts

as it does because of the nature of the bloodstream as a

whole.

We,

like the worm, remain ignorant of how the whole

and its parts are connected.

We can acquire the convic-

tion that every part of nature is related to the whole,
but to truly know this is impossible for the human mind,

47

since

"then it

its parts.

would be necessary

"to

know all of nature and

37

As mentioned, all the above scholars assume that the

intellect in question in Spinoza’s definition is the finite
intellect.

Wolf son explicitly states, "By the term ’in-

tellect’ in this definition Spinoza means the finite huOO

man intellect."
tion warranted?

But, it must be asked,
I

believe it is not.

is such an assump-

It cannot be the case

that "attribute" is defined as that (and only that) which
the finite intellect perceives of substance, since Spinoza

asserts both that, 1) the finite intellect can perceive
only two attributes, and 2) there are an infinite number
of attributes.

Since the attributes are infinite, no finite

intellect could perceive them all.

Only the infinite in-

39
tellect can perceive an infinite number of attributes. '

Since all the attributes are attributes of substance, and
since only the infinite intellect can conceive them all,
it must be the case that the intellect Spinoza refers to
in his definition of "attribute" is the infinite intellect
of God.

37

.

A passage from the Ethics supports this view.

Spinoza, Correspondence
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Spinoza states, "...whatsoever

\_

i .e

the attributes! can

,

be perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the

essence of substance, belongs altogether only to one sub40
stance."
This passage shows that the term "intellect"
in Spinoza's definition of "attribute" must at the very

least apply to the infinite intellect.

It is clear then,

that the vast majority of Spinoza scholars are mistaken in

assuming that

"

intellectus " in Spinoza's definition of

"attribute" definitely refers to the finite intellect.
Since Spinoza clearly means by "intellect" the infi-

nite intellect, it seems that the subjective/objective

question so long debated by scholars is easily resolved.
No one could question that what the infinite intellect

perceives it perceives truly.

It is only when one incor-

rectly identifies the intellect as only the finite intellect that the problem ever arises.

The infinite intellect

can perceive things only as they are in reality, for the
infinite intellect is active and subject to no inadequate
ideas.

"Subjectivists" such as Wolfson, therefore, are mis-

taken.

Arguments which attempt to show that the finite

intellect perceives things truly are unnecessary.

The

entire subjective/objective debate dissolves when one

40

.
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,
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realizes that the intellect in question is the infinite

intellect of God.

I

have just discussed the attributes of substance for

Spinoza.

It has been argued that Spinoza is not a "sub-

jectivist” with regard to the existence of attributes in

substance

The attributes are real aspects of substance

.

They are mind independent, and hence would exist even if
there were no minds to perceive them.
It is, at this point, appropriate to say something

about Spinoza's views on universals

.

He appears to be a

conceptualist with regard to the existence of universals.

According to him, general ideas or universals originate
because human beings are only capable of distinctly forming a limited number of images.

When this number becomes

too large the images get confused.

If the number becomes

excessively large, the distinct individual images all
blend into one another.

Spinoza states:

transcendental Cs such as Being, Thing,
Some thing .. .arose from the fact, that the
human body, being limited, is only
capable of distinctly forming a certain number of images .. .within itself
at the same time; if this number be
exceeded, the images will begin to be
confused; if this number of images,
which the body is capable of forming
distinctly within itself, be largely
exceeded, all will become entirely
confused one with another. This being so, it is evident ... that the human
.

.

.
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mind can distinctly imagine as
many things simultaneously, as its
body can form images simultaneously.
When the images become quite confused in the body, the mind also imagines all bodies confusedly without
any distinction, and will comprehend
them, as it were, under one attribute,
namely, under the attribute of Being,
Thing &c .^1
,

Spinoza goes on to say:

From similar causes arise those notions, which we call general such
,

as man, horse, dog, &c
They arise,
to wit, from the fact that so many
images, for instance, of men, are
formed simultaneously in the human
mind, that the powers of imagination
break down, not indeed utterly, but
to the extent of the mind losing
count of small differences between
individuals ( e .g
colour, size, &c
and their definite number, and only
distinctly imagining that, in which
all the individuals, in so far as
the body is affected by them, agree;
for that is the point, in which each
of the said individuals chiefly
affected the body; this the mind expresses by the name man, and this it
predicates of an infinite number of
particular individuals. For, as we
have said, it is unable to imagine
the definite number of individuals
.

.

,

^

Hence, for Spinoza (as Parkinson has correctly pointed
out), a universal "...is an imagination of a vague and con-

fused kind."^

41

.

Again, for Spinoza, universals represent
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"...ideas in the highest degree confused."^1
states,

Elsewhere he

"...abstract notions are nothing but modes of ima-

ginmg ..." 45
.

.

Given Spinoza's understanding of the problem of universals (a conceptualist

'

s

understanding), one can reason-

ably ask whether his views on them are consistent with an

understanding of attributes as objective aspects of substance.

Given that, 1) our ideas of universals are only

confused products of the imagination (dependent on the imagining mind for their existence), and 2) attributes are generally thought of as universals, it would seem that to be

consistent Spinoza would have to hold that the attributes
But, as I have argued, Spinoza is not

are mind dependent.

a "subjectivist" with regard to the attributes.

like substance, mind independent.

They are,

They would exist even if

there were no minds to perceive them.

Further, Spinoza dis-

tinguishes attributes from universals by holding that the

attributes are products of the intellect, not the imagination.
It seems consistent for Spinoza to hold that ideas

of the attributes as universals which apply to a number of

things are confused products of the imagination. In thinking

44

.
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of attributes as universals which apply to a number
of things we incorrectly suppose,

1)

that they are proper-

ties of general aspects shared by many things; and 2) that
our ideas refer to independent qualities shared by many
things.

The attributes really are properties of substance.

We can have adequate ideas of the attributes when, and only

when, we correct our mistaken assumptions of the imagina-

tion by using our intellect, which gives us a correct un-

derstanding of substance.

Through the intellect we will

realize that there is only one subject of predicates (not

many subjects), and that the attributes are correctly
thought of as properties of one thing (not many things).
Hence, although we generally think of attributes as uni-

versals which apply to a number of individual things, this
makes no sense in a monistic system like Spinoza's, where
there is only one thing.
'

universal

.

"The term

.carries associations which would be only

confusing in its use

46

As Wolf son states:

m

connection with Spinoza."
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CHAPTER III
ESSENCE

I

have argued in Chapter II that for Spinoza the at-

tributes of a substance are real things, and not simply subjective modes of perception.

In this chapter

I

will attempt

to discover what kind of a thing an attribute is in Spinoza's

thought.

Are the attributes of a substance what one would

call properties (essential or accidental), or are they something else altogether?

In order to answer this question it

is important to turn to a discussion of the notion of "essence

in Spinoza.

Since Spinoza defines "attribute" as that which

constitutes the essence of a substance, it is reasonable to

assume that for Spinoza "attribute" and "essence" have, at
the very least,

lar referents).

similar connotations (and perhaps even simiIn order, then,

to understand Spinoza's

meaning of the term "attribute" it is necessary that one
has an understanding of the meaning of the term "essence"
in Spinoza's thinking.
To understand Spinoza's meaning of the notion of "es-

sence" it must be known if his understanding of the term

"essence" bears any resemblance to what is commonly thought
of as the meaning of that term.

Does Spinoza, for example,

make any clear distinction between "essence" and "essential
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property?"

Does his notion of "essence"

(and hence "attri-

bute") reduce itself to what we would simply call an essential property, or does he have an understanding of the term

"essence" similar to one in use today?
these questions

I

In order to answer

follow a distinction employed by Alvin

Plantinga in his article, "World and Essence." 1

In this

article Plantinga attempts to show the difference between

what is called an essential property and what is called an
essence or "haecceity"

.

According to Plantinga, a property is an essential
property of a thing

X,

just in case X has it and there is

no world in which X has its complement.

An essence or

"haecceity", on the other hand, is not only a property

which is essential to

X,

but has the further feature that

nothing distinct from X can have it

m

any world.

2

In

otherwords, an essence, in Plantinga' s sense, has the feature of uniquely individuating whatever has it.

Thus, for

Plantinga, there is a distinction between an essence and an

essential property.
In accordance with Plantinga' s distinction,

tempt to answer the following questions:

I

shall at-

Is an essence

(and

hence an attribute), for Spinoza, something that uniquely

Y~.

2

.

A. Plantinga,
October 1970,

Ibid.

,

474.

"World and Essence," Philosophical Review
461-492.

,
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individuates whatever has it (and hence not something
shared by two or more distinct individuals), or does

Spinoza's idea of what an essence is simply reduce to
what Plantinga and

would call an essential property?

I

Does an attribute, for Spinoza, in constituting the essence
of substance constitute an essence in Plantinga’

s

sense

(uniquely individuate that substance), or is it simply an

essential property of that substance?

It is only through

an understanding of the answers to these questions that one
can comprehend what Spinoza means by the term "attribute"
Therefore, the crucial question to ask with regard to

Spinoza is whether an essence is something that uniquely
individuates whatever has it, or something that can be

present in two or more distinct individuals.

Perhaps an

answer to this can be found by looking once again at how

Spinoza defines "essence"
[P]

.

I consider as belonging to the essence of
a thing that, which being given, the thing
is necessarily given also, and, which being removed, the thing is necessarily re-

moved also; in other words, that without
which the thing, and which itself without
the thing, can neither be nor be conceived .3

What can be said about the above definition [P]?

First, it

is important to clarify what it means in Spinoza's thought

for an essence to exist.

3

.

Spinoza, Ethics

,

82.
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the following:

....Fn.

Let an essence E he a sum of properties Fix

Then E exists iff (3X) (Fix

some thing, and let E he X's essence.
X exists

sE

exists.

Fnx)

.

Now let X he

Then [P] says that

That is, E can neither he nor be con-

ceived without X and X can neither be nor he conceived

without E.

(This is,

I

think, the most plausible way of

filling out Spinoza's meaning in [P].)

What implications

does this definition [P] have regarding the question of

whether an essence is for Spinoza an essential property or
an essence in Plantinga's sense?
[P] shows that for Spinoza an essence is at the very

least an essential property, since X can neither he nor he

conceived without E.

[P] also shows that an essence for

Spinoza is something more than an essential property, since
the implication goes both ways.

Not only is it the case

that X can neither he nor he conceived without E, hut E can

neither he nor be conceived without X.

In general, the only

requirement for an essential property is that the thing can

neither he nor he conceived without it.

So it is true that

[P] shows that an essence is something more than an essen-

tial property.

I

contend, however, that [P] does not in-

dicate that an essence for Spinoza uniquely individuates
the thing that has it.

In order for [P] to show that an

essence uniquely individuates, a further clause would have
distinct
to he added to [P] stating that no other thing
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from X can have E.

In order for an essence to uniquely

individuate it must not only he true that X cannot exist

without E, and E without

hut in addition, E cannot

X,

exist in any other thing.

Spinoza's definition of "es-

sence" as represented in [P] does not meet this requirement, and therefore does not present us with something

which uniquely individuates.
An objection might he raised against my interpretation
of [P].

It might he argued that [P] shows that an essence

for Spinoza uniquely individuates for the following reason:

Suppose two people, a and h, have the same essence,

e_.

Also, suppose there is a world w in which a exists, hut h

does not.

In such a world

This violates [P].

e

is given,

hut h is not given.

This argument, however, does not seem

to me to he a valid objection to

my claim that [P] does not

indicate that an essence, for Spinoza, uniquely individuates.
I

think that Spinoza would claim that the case represented

above cannot happen according to [P]

.

Following [P], if a

exists in world w, then the essence of a exists in world w.
If the essence of a exists in world w, and a and b have the

same essence, then according to [P] b must also exist in

world w.

In otherwords, Spinoza would claim that where a

and h have the same essence there is no world in which a
exists and h does not.
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Using

3-S

an indicator of what an essence is for

Spinoza, one is inclined to say that an essence for him
is little more than what would he called an essential
pro-

perty.

Since an attribute is that which "constitutes the

4
f s s ence of substance,"

an attribute is basically an essen-

tial property, and not something which uniquely individuates
a substance

.

Other statements Spinoza makes concerning an

essence need to be examined, however, before it can be de-

termined if this is indeed his meaning.
In a crucial passage in the Ethics, where Spinoza at-

tempts to show that from an "essence" or "nature" no defi-

nite number of individuals can be deduced, he once again

appears to imply that the same essence can apply to several

different individuals and hence does not uniquely individuate

.

He says

...the definition of a triangle expresses nothing beyond the actual nature of a triangle
it does not imply
any fixed number of triangles .5
:

Spinoza goes on to imply that any number of individual triangles can have the same nature or essence
Furthermore, in an important passage in the Ethics

,

Spinoza unequivocally implies that several individuals can
have the same essence.
44

Spinoza, Ethics

5-

Ibid.

,

50.

,
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[Q] For example, a man is the cause of
another man's existence, but not of
his essence (for the latter is an
eternal truth), and, therefore, the
two men may be entirely similar in
essence but must be different in
existence; and hence if the existence
of one of them cease
the existence
of the other will not necessarily
cease also; but if the essence of the
one could be destroyed, and be made
false, the essence of the other would
be destroyed also.
,

,

Given quotations such as [Ql, it appears that an essence for

Spinoza is what Plantinga would call an essential property.
It is something that is essential to the thing that has it,

but which can also be present in other individuals.

Since

an attribute constitutes an essence, it seems as if an at-

tribute is basically an essential property also.

Unfortunately, however, this issue is not as simple to

unravel as it first appears.

We have other statements by

Spinoza which seem to imply just the opposite

(

i .e

.

,

that

two or more distinct individuals cannot share the same es-

sence or nature).

The most obvious example of this is in

proposition V (discussed previously), where Spinoza states,
"There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances
n

having the same nature or attribute.”'

(Call this [R].)

As has been seen, Spinoza also states in the Ethics

Z~.

Spinoza, Ethics

7-

Ibid

,

47.

,
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(proposition XIV) that, "...if any substance besides God
v/ere

granted, it would have to be explained by some attri-

bute of God, and thus two substances with the same attri-

bute would exist, which... is absurd..."
In quotations such as

(Call this [S].)

and Cs^ Spinoza seems to give a

notion of "essence" or "attribute" which corresponds
Plantinga's,

i

.

e

.

,

to

uniquely individuating.

There appears to be an inconsistency between [P] and
[Q], and [R] and [S].

Spinoza states in [P] and [Q] that

an essence (or nature or attribute) can be shared by two or
more distinct individuals.
[S]),

Yet, he also states (in [R] and

that an essence or attribute cannot be shared by two

or more distinct individuals.
It seems that there are three possible solutions to

this apparent inconsistency in Spinoza's thought.

One easy

solution to this problem is to point out that in [R] and [S]

Spinoza is talking about substances, whereas in quotations
like [Q] he is speaking about modes, not substances.

this interpretation #1.)

(Call

One could say that Spinoza has a

different notion of "essence" or "attribute" when it is

applied to substances than when it is applied

An essence or attribute when it applies

to

to modes.

modes is an essen-

tial property, and hence can be shared by two or more distinct
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individuals; an essence or attribute as it applies to
O

substances uniquely individuates.
A second possible solution (call this interpretation

# 11

is the following:

),

It could be pointed out that in

[Q] Spinoza is definitely talking about the notion of

"essence”, whereas in [R] and [S] he is speaking about

"attribute", not "essence".

The apparent inconsistency

could then be remedied by holding that "essence", for Spinoza,

is not identical to "attribute "--that they are two

different concepts

.

Whereas essence is what we would call

an essential property, an attribute uniquely individuates.
A third way of solving this particular problem (call

this interpretation #111), which is equally as plausible as

both of the above, is the following:

It could be said that

although Spinoza uses "attribute" and "essence" interchangeably, he has two different senses of these terms.

This is

perhaps what Powell meant when he suggested, "It would be
a mistake to suppose that he is consistent in his use of the

word 'essence'

It seems that Spinoza sometimes uses

"attribute" or "essence" in the sense of essential property,
Q~.

It should be mentioned that it is not clear that Spinoza
holds that modes have attributes or essences. There is,
however, textual support that could be presented pointing to the fact that he does hold this. See for example,
Spinoza, Correspondenc e 313
*

,

9.

Powell, Spinoza and Religion

,

138
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and sometimes he uses "attribute" or "essence" in the sense
of uniquely individuating.

An attribute or essence is an

essential property whenever "attribute" or "essence" sig-

nifies an atomic attribute.

In otherwords

,

whenever

"attribute" or "essence" is used in the sense of an indi-

vidual attribute or essence, it has the meaning of essential property.

This sense of "attribute" or "essence" could

be represented as follows:

For any entity x, if p is an

atomic attribute of x (where x ranges over both modes and

substances) then p is an essential property of x.

An attri-

bute or essence is an essence of x (uniquely individuates)

whenever "attribute" or "essence" signifies the collection
of all the attributes.

That is to say, whenever "attribute"

or "essence" is used in the sense of "sum" attribute, it

uniquely individuates.

This sense of "attribute" or "es-

sence" could be represented as follows:
if s is the sum attribute of x then

s

For any entity x,

is the essence of x.

The apparent inconsistency between QP H and [Q] and [R] and
[S] could then be remedied along the following lines:

In

[R] and [S] Spinoza is using the term "attribute" in the

sense of sum attribute, and claiming that no two things can
share all their attributes in common.

In such a case they

would have the same essence and there would be no reason to
speak of them as two.

In quotations such as [Q] Spinoza is

using the notion of "attribute" or "essence" in the sense of
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an atomic attribute, and claiming that two distinct things

may share the same atomic attribute or essence
tial property).

(

i ,e

,

essen-

It is not the case that Spinoza believes

two things cannot have an attribute or essential property

in common, for indeed they can and do.

What cannot happen

is that two distinct things share all their attributes in

common.

On this interpretation, Spinoza does have a sense

of "essence" which corresponds to Plantinga's:

That which

uniquely individuates x (or x's essence) is the collection
of all of its attributes
It is evident thus far that there are three possible

ways to circumvent the apparent inconsistency in quotations
[p] and [Q], and [R] and [S].

Each of these interpreta-

tions has a certain plausibility.

It seems, however, that

interpretation #111 is preferable to either interpretation
#1 or interpretation #11.

Interpretations #1 and #11 would solve the inconsistency

between quotations [P] and [Q], and [R] and [S], but

I

not believe that Spinoza ever held either of these two
views.

Interpretations #1 and #11 might be represented

as follows:

do
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//I

B.

essence--mode
attribute--mode

C.
D.

essence--substance
attribute--substance

essential property
essential property
essence (uniquely individuates)
essence (uniquely individuates)

B.

essence--mode
attribute--mode

essential property
essence (uniquely individuates)

C

essence--substance

essential property
essence (uniquely individuates)

A

#11 A

.

.

.

D. attribute--substance

As can be seen from the above chart, both interpretations
#1 and #11 make the claim that whenever the term "essence"

in Spinoza is applied to a mode, it signifies an essential

property

(

i .e

.

,

#1

.A

.

and #II.A.).

The falseness of this

claim is indicated by the following quotations from
Spinoza
A definition, if it is to be called perfect, must explain the inmost essence of
a thing, and must take care not to substiIn
tute for this any of its properties
order to illustrate my meaning, without
taking an example which would seem to show
a desire to expose other people's errors,
I will choose the case of something abstract, the definition of which is of litSuch is a circle. If a cirtle moment.
cle be defined as a figure, such that all
straight lines drawn from the centre to
the circumference are equal, every one
can see that such a definition does not
in the least explain the essence of a
circle, but solely one of its properties.
Though, as I have said, this is of no importance in the case of figures and other
abstractions, it is of great importance
in the case of physical beings and realifor the properties of things are
ties:
not understood so long as their essences
.

are unknown.! 0

10.

Spinoza, On the Improvement of the Understanding
trans R. H. Elwes (New York: Dover Inc., 1955 ). 35
B.

.

,

-
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In the above quotation Spinoza is talking about a mode

(

i .e

,

a circle), and claiming that we must not confuse the proper-

ties of things with their essences.

Interpretation #1 and

#11, therefore, which claim that whenever the term ’'essence"
is applied to a mode the meaning is that of essential pro-

perty

,

are mistaken.

The above is a case where the term

"essence” is applied to a mode and no property whatsoever
is signified.

Spinoza clearly states that it would be a

mistake to think of an essence here as a property of any
kind.

It seems much more likely that Spinoza has in mind

here a notion of "essence" which corresponds to Plantinga's

use of the term

(

i .e

.

,

something which uniquely individuates).

Spinoza asserts a very similar thought in the following passage, when in talking about different modes of per-

ception he states:
Perception arising when the essence of
one thing is inferred from another thing,
but not adequately; this comes when from
some effect we gather its cause, or when
it is inferred from some general proposition that some property is always present
....
In the second case something is ascribed to the cause because of the effect,
as we shall show in an example, but only
a property, never the essence.

Spinoza goes on to use as his examples, the mind and the
body.

Once again Spinoza distinguishes, in the case of modes,

a property from an essence

11.

Spinoza, Improvement of Understanding

,

8.
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There are two further quotations

I

would like to pre-

sent which provide evidence against interpretations #1 and

# 11

:

The affect of one person differs from
the corresponding affect of another as
much as the essence of the one person
differs from that of the other .. .desire
is the very nature or essence of a person... and therefore the desire of one
person differs from the desire of another
as much as the nature or essence of the
one differs from that of the other
joy and sorrow are desire or appetite
in so far as the latter is increased,
diminished, helped, or limited by external causes; that is to say... they are the
nature itself of each person. 12
.

.

.

.

.the difference between the essence of

one thing and the essence of another thing
is the same as that which exists between
the reality or existence of one thing and
the reality or existence of another...
[Spinoza goes on to use as an example here,
the person Adam.]13
In both of these quotations Spinoza appears to give a mean-

ing to the notion of "essence" which corresponds to that

which Plantinga means by something which uniquely indiviIn the first quotation Spinoza

duates whatever has it.

makes desire equivalent

to

the essence or nature of man.

He further states that as the desire of one person differs

from that of another, so too the essence of the one must
12

.

13.

Spinoza, Ethics ed. John Wild (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 193°)* 262.
B.

,

Spinoza, Improvement of Understanding

,

19*
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differ from that of the other.

This suggests a real dif-

ference in essence between individuals.

In the second

quotation Spinoza says that the difference between the essence of Adam and the essence of man in general is the same
as the difference between the existence of Adam and the

existence of man in general.

Since presumably the existence

of each individual is unique, it seems that Spinoza is

equating an essence here with something that uniquely individuates.

Hence, at least in these particular quotations

which have modes as their referents, one is led to believe
that "essence" means that which uniquely individuates.

Given the above quotations the claim made by both

interpretations #1 and #11, that whenever the term "essence"
is applied to a mode it signifies an essential property
(#1 .A

.

and #11

.A

.

)

,

is false

.

A further passage from the Correspondence shows the

falseness of the claim in interpretation #11 that "essence"

when applied
property

(

i .e

to
.

,

a substance always signifies an essential

#II.C.)s

.in the universe there cannot exist
two substances without their differ.

.

ing utterly in essence...

Here the notion of "essence" is applied to substances, and
the meaning is that of uniquely individuating.

14

.

Spinoza, Correspondence

,

277-

68

Interpretations #1 and #11, therefore, must be rejected,
since neither is true of Spinoza.
the other hand,

Interpretation #111, on

does not have these difficulties.

One dis-

tinct advantage is that it not only solves the aforementioned

inconsistency in Spinoza, but is also not disproved or in-

validated by anything Spinoza has written.

Interpretation

#111 has another distinct advantage in that it renders Spinoza consistent with regard to the problem raised by Simon De

Vries.

If either interpretation #1 or #11 is attributed to

Spinoza, he is rendered inconsistent according to the problem

raised by De Vries.

(This will be discussed in a chapter

which follows.)
To recapitulate,

the question as posed at the beginning

of this chapter can now be answered:

Are the attributes of

substance what one would call properties, or are they something else altogether?
H. A. Wolf son has stated that the attributes,

for

Spinoza, are "...what the mediaevals called essential attributes, that is to say, attributes which constitute the es1
sence." ^

A.

Donagan has claimed that Spinoza followed

Descartes, even in his early draft of the Ethics

,

in his

use of the word "attribute" as "a synonym for what Descartes

had called 'principal attribute —the one principal property
'

15.

Wolf son, Spinoza Vol.

I,

145
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of each substance which constitutes its essence

."

15

Many have disagreed with this way of interpreting Spinoza,

opposing the designation of an attribute as a property of a
substance.

Hallett states, for example, that,

The term "attribute" indicates clearly
enough that it is not to be taken in the
vulgar sense of a characteristic or quality related to a substance as, for example,
redness to a rose... The Attributes are
neither qualities or characteristics of
substance The Attribute is the substance
under the determining scrutiny of the intellect 1 ?

—

.

Curley states, "...the attributes do not exist in anything
other than themselves..."

1^

It is my view that Wolfson and Donagan are, in this

regard, essentially correct, while Curley and Hallett are

mistaken.

Spinoza used the word "attribute" to denote the

essential properties of a substance.

These essential pro-

perties are things which constitute or make up the essence
of substance.

The word "attribute" itself suggests a pro-

perty or predicate--something which is attributed to something else.

Each attribute refers, however, to only that

property of a substance which constitutes its essence.
There is in Spinoza's writings textual support for the view

±Z~.

Donagan "Essence and the Distinction of Attributes
in Spinoza's Metaphysics," in Spinoza M. Grene ed., 165

A

.

,

,

,

17.

Benedict De Spinoza; The Elements of his
Philosophy (London: Athlone, 1957 )» 16
H.

F. Hallett,

.

18.

E. M. Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics: An Essay in Interpretation Cambridge: Harvard University, 1969). 18
(

•
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that an attribute is a property.

In the Ethics Spinoza

uses the terms "attribute" and "property" interchangeably,
stating, "...[the intellect] infers more properties in pro-

portion as the definition of the thing expresses more reality..."
ment,

19'

Compare this quotation with Spinoza's state-

"The more reality or being a thing has the greater the

number of its attributes."

20

This indicates that the attri-

butes are really properties, and since they constitute the

essence of substance they are essential, not non-essential,

properties

.

What, then, is the essence of substance, and what is
its connection with the attributes?

The answer to this has

The essence of substance is the collec-

already been given.

tion of the infinite attributes, and each attribute goes
into constituting that essence

.

Each individual attribute

is a part of the essence of substance

.

The collection of

the attributes is the essence of substance.

Hence, Spinoza

did follow Descartes in his usage of the term "attribute".
He,

too, used the term "attribute" to connote the one prin-

cipal property of each substance which constitutes its

essence

19

.

20.

.

Spinoza, Ethics
Ibid., 50.

,
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CHAPTER

IV

SUBSTANCE
Through much of the history of philosophy prior to
Spinoza, it was traditionally assumed that along with the

infinite substance or God there also existed a number of

finite substances.

These finite substances were seen to

depend in some way on the infinite substance God.

Given

this dependence their proper substantial character, ac-

cording to the traditional definition of "substance" as
the independently existent, became a dubious assumption.

Although Descartes had recognized this problem and reduced
the many substances to two main kinds (and even disposed
of these by admitting that the only substance which clearly

meets the definition of "substance" is God), no one before

Spinoza had definitely and decisively drawn the conclusion
that there could be, and was, only one substance in the

universe
H. A.

Wolfson has traced the definition of "substance"

from the time of Aristotle, through the medievals, to the
time of Descartes and Spinoza.

1

In this work Wolfson shows

similarities among definitions which cannot be ignored.
1.

Wolfson, Spinoza Vol.

I,

61-78.

72

Aristotle begins his metaphysical investigations by

dividing all Being into substance and accidents

He gives

•

at least six different definitions of "substance”.

Cer-

tain of these definitions are very important to an under-

standing of later philosophers such as Descartes and SpinoOne such definition is the following:

za.

"Some things

can exist apart and some cannot, and it is the former that
are substances."

2

This criterion of a substance points

to the notion of "independent existence".

A substance,

according to Aristotle, can exist on its own--it can exist
apart from other things.

Qualities and relations, on the

other hand, exist only as the qualities or relations of

substances
The idea that substances can exist apart from, or in-

dependent of, their qualities is challenged by critics of
Aristotle.

Though some philosophers

(

i

.

e

.

,

Platonists)

hold that qualities can exist without a substance, few
hold that a substance can exist without qualities
3
totle does not seem to deal with this problem.

.

Aris-

As will

become evident, a very similar problem exists in Spinoza.
2.

Aristotle, Metaphysics XII, 5. 1070b, 36-1071a,
in Introduction to Aristotle ed. Richard McKeon
(New York: Modern Library, 19^7), 279,

I»

,

3

.

have taken much of my information on Aristotle and
Descartes from D. J. O'Connor, "Substance and Attribute,"
Vol. 8 (New York: Macin Encyclopedia of Philosophy
mi llajTrT^^TTT^^WT
I

,
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Another criterion of a substance for Aristotle is
that which is a substratum.

A substance is a substratum

which underlies and supports its qualities, "...while remaining numerically one and the same

.

.

Both the idea

that substance is a substratum, and the idea that a sub-

stance is capable of independent existence, are later de-

veloped by Descartes and Spinoza.
Wolfson points out that early medievals begin their

metaphysical investigations not with the phrase that all
Being is divided into substance and accidents (like Aristotle), but rather with the statement that all Being is

divided into that which dwells within a dwelling and that

which does not dwell within a dwelling.

This phraseology

is later refined to read that all Being is divided into

that which is in itself and that which is in a subject.
The former is called "substance",

the latter is called

"accident"

Descartes claims that a substance can exist indepen-

dently in the following quotation:
By substance, we understand nothing else
than a thing which so exists that it needs
no other thing in order to exist. And in
fact only one single substance can be understood which clearly needs nothing else,

W~.

Aristotle, Categories in Basic Works of Aristotle
ed Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941 ), 13
,

,

.

5-

Wolfson, Spinoza Vol.

I,

62.
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namely God... That is why the word
substance does not pertain univoce to
God and to other things, as they say in
the schools, that is, no common signification for this appellation which will
apply equally to God and to them can be
distinctly understood.
He further states,

"Really the notion of substance

is just this--that which can exist by itself, without the

aid of any other substance."'
In the first quotation Descartes claims that a sub-

stance is a thing which does not depend upon any other

thing for its existence.

He does not clarify what he

means by "any other thing."

He goes on to state that God

is the only being to whom the term "substance" is properly

applied (although he continues to apply the term "substance"
to finite created things).

In the second quotation Descartes specifies what he

means by "any other thing."

He means "any other substance."

This second definition, of course, is unsatisfactory, since

What

it is circular.

We can still ask of this definition:

is a substance?

As we shall see, a similar problem arises

in an interpretation of Spinoza's definition of "substance".

Ren£ Descartes. Philosophical Works of Descartes Vol.
trans F. S. Haldane (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1934), 239-240.
,

.

7.

Rene Descartes, Philosophical Works Vol. II, 2nd Ed.,
trans. Haldane & Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Cited in O'Connor, Encyclopedia
Press, 1931), 101.
of Philosophy Vol. 8 38
,

,

,

-
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According to Descartes, substances are not only
things which can exist independently, hut they are also
the subjects in which properties inhere:

Everything in which anything is immediately contained, as in a subject, or
through which anything we perceive exists— that is, any property, or quality,
or attribute of which we have in ourselves a real idea--is called substance

o

.

In this definition, a substance is the subject of properties

or attributes.

This is reminiscent of Aristotle, where a

substance is a substratum in which properties inhere
In Spinoza's definitions of "substance" and "mode"

there are elements of Aristotle, the medievals and Des-

Spinoza's formal definition of "substance" appears

cartes.

in definition III, Part

I

of the Ethics

,

and reads:

By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself; in
other words, that of which a conception
can be formed independently of any other
conception .9

Spinoza's formal definition of "mode" appears in definition
V,

Part

I

of the Ethics, and reads:

By mode, I mean the modifications of substance, or that which exists in, and is
conceived through, something other than
itself .I®

8.

Spinoza, "Principles of the Philosophy of Descartes,"
in Earlier Philosophical Writings trans Frank A. Hayes
(New York: Bobbs-Merrill 1963), 22

B.

,

,

9.

10.

Spinoza, Ethics
Ibid.

,

45

-

.
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Wolf son points out that Spinoza, follows the mgdievals in

calling that thing which is in itself (or does not dwell

within a dwelling) "substance".

He departs from the medie-

vals, however, by replacing the term "accident" with the

term "mode".

Wolfson shows that Spinoza's use of the term

"mode" instead of "accident" can be traced to Descartes.

Descartes uses the term "accident" as synonymous with
"mode", and the opposite of "substance".

Spinoza himself

ascribes his division of Being into substance and mode to
Descartes.

11

Also, in Spinoza's earlier writings he uses

the term "accident" instead of the term "mode".

1

p

An accident or mode for Spinoza is distinguished
from a substance in the following way:

A mode cannot exist

without the substance or subject of which it is a mode.
substance exists in itself and not in any other subject.

Spinoza insists upon the strict application of the traditional definition of "substance"

.

Nothing which exists

in something else in any sense or manner can be called

"substance".

As Wolfson states,

Note that he does not reject the generally
accepted definition of substance; on the
contrary, he insists upon its rigid appliOnly that which is really and abcation.
solutely in itself can be called substance,
11

.

Spinoza, " Thoughts on Metaphysics," in Earlier
Philosophical Writings 135-136.

B.

,

12.

See references in Wolfson, Spinoza Vol.

I,

66.
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and so only that which is called the
Necessary of Existence or God can be
truly called substance. All the other
things which belong to the so-called
possible of existence are not substance;
they are what the Medievals would have
called accidents, but which Spinoza prefers to call by a new name, modes... 13

Wolfson's interpretation is supported by Spinoza when in
a dialogue in the Short Treatise he states:

What you say, 0 Desire, that there are
different substances, that, I tell you
is false; for I see clearly that there
is but One, which exists through itself,
and is a support to all other attributes
And if you will refer to the material and
mental as substances, in relation to the
modes which are dependent on them, why
then, you must also call them modes in
relation to the substances on which
they depend; for they are not conceived
by you as existing through themselves .1^
Hence the first part of Spinoza's definition of "substance" follows the tradition of Aristotle, the medievals

and Descartes.

The only apparent change is that Spinoza

insists upon the strict application of that definition.

Spinoza thinks of a substance as capable of independent

existence

.

He says in his letter to Christian Juyghens

that if you ask,

"...whether there be only a single Being

who subsists by his own sufficiency or force?

I

not only

affirm this to be so, but also undertake to prove it..."
13-

Wolfson, Spinoza Vol.

14

.

Spinoza, Short Treatise

,

6l

15.

Spinoza, Correspondence

,

353

I,

71.

-
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It is "in itself" and needs no other thing in order to

exist.

The first part of Spinoza's definition of "sub-

stance" encounters difficulties similar to those mentioned

regarding the definitions of Aristotle and Descartes.

One

can ask of Spinoza, as critics have asked of Aristotle,
if it is possible for a substance to exist without attri-

butes.

If the answer is no, then is it true that a sub-

stance can exist independently?

It is much more question-

able to assert the existence of a substance without attributes, than to assert the existence of attributes without
a substance

Suppose, however, that when Spinoza claims a substance
is in itself he does not mean that it exists without any

attributes, but rather that it does not depend upon those

attributes for its existence

.

It can cause and sustain

itself without any help from its attributes.

problematic

.

This is also

The attributes constitute the essence of sub-

stance, and the essence of a thing is that, "without which
the thing can neither be nor be conceived."

III.)

(See Chapter

Hence, it seems that a substance does depend upon

its attributes for its existence.

As such Spinoza cannot

claim that by "in itself" he means that a substance does
not depend upon anything else, including its attributes,
for its existence

.
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Perhaps Spinoza means that a substance with its

attributes is what is capable of independent existence.
The definition of "substance" then reads:

df

.

x is a substance =

x is a thing which with its attributes is capable of

existing independently of any other y (where y is / x).
Then, however, the question must be asked (as it was

asked of Descartes):
over?

In otherwords

What is it that the variable y ranges
,

w hat is the "any other y" that a sub-

stance with its attributes is independent of?

If the an-

swer is other substances with their attributes, then it

seems that Spinoza's definition of "substance" is, although

not strictly circular, uninformative.

If we do not have

some prior concept of substance we will not be able to

pick out the domain to which these other substances with
their attributes refer.

If "any other y" does not refer

to other substances with their attributes,

us what "any other y" refers to

.

then he must tell

It seems that what Spino-

za offers as a definition of "substance" is more properly

thought of as a statement which contains primitives that
are supposed to be self-evident.

Defining "substance" as

that which is independent of any other y where y ranges

over other substances still leaves us puzzled about the
question:

What is a substance?

Further, Spinoza defines

"attribute" as that which constitutes the essence of substance
This definition, together with the above proposed definition

.
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of "substance" leads to circularity.

One cannot define

"substance" with reference to "attribute" without circu-

larity

.

In the second part of Spinoza's definition of "sub-

stance" he departs from the traditional definition, making

an epistemological claim.

He claims not only that a sub-

stance is "in itself," but that it does not presuppose any

other conception in order to be itself conceived.

Hence,

part of what it means to say x is a substance, is to say
that x is a thing that does not require the conception of

Again it must be asked:

any other thing.
other thing" here?

What is "any

If we suppose that "any other thing"

is any other substance,

then to say x is a substance implies

x is a thing that does not require the conception of any

This makes Spinoza's definition circular.

other substance.

If this part of the definition is rewritten so that "thing"

in "any other thing" is construed to be a variable, as is
done in the first part of the definition of "substance",

that is,

(x) (y ) (x is a substance & x

/ y ^ the conception

of x does not require the conception of y), the implication

seems to be false.

It appears to be false

(as will be evi-

dent in Chapter VI when the Leibniz problem is discussed),
since it seems that the concept of the attributes is neces-

sary for the concept of substance.

Hence, Spinoza's defi-

nition of "substance" seems to be either circular, false,
or uninformative

.
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Thus far it has been shown

"that;

pant; of

Spinoza's

definition of "substance" is in the tradition of Aristotle
and Descartes.

When Spinoza says that a substance is "in

itself" he is claiming, along with his two predecessors,

that a substance can exist independently.

I

believe, as

Joachim does, that Spinoza also followed Descartes and

Aristotle in holding that a substance is the subject of
properties.
"

.

.

As Joachim states in speaking of Spinoza,

.the antithesis of Substance and its states or modifi-

cations is a more precise formulation of the popular an-

tithesis of thing and properties." 1 ^

According to Spinoza,

"Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in

something else." 17

A substance, as we have seen,

what exists in itself.

Everything else

(

i .e

.

,

modes and

attributes), for Spinoza, exists in substance.
words, Spinoza holds a substratum theory.

is

In other-

A substance is

a substratum in which a variety of properties inhere, and

which supports all the qualities inhering in it.

There

are essential properties, or attributes, and there are

non-essential properties, or modes.

The substance itself

is something distinct from the sum of its attributes.

16

.

H. Joachim, A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza
15
(New York: Russell & Russell, 1 ^ 6 ^ )

H.

,

17.

Spinoza, Ethics

,

46.
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When

I

claim that Spinoza held a substratum view of

substance

I

am not referring to the theory (sometimes

called the "substratum theory") where substance is a socalled "bare particular"

.

This is correctly the view of

some "subjectivists" considered in Chapter II.

ing of "substratum"

I

The mean-

have in mind is the one put forth

by such scholars as Morris Lazerowitz in his article,
"Substratum"

.

Lazerowitz offers the following three

characteristics of the "substratum" view:
(1) A substance is a thing in which a
variety of properties inhere, or
which support them or is their

bearer

held to
the sum
distinct
from
something
be
properties.
of its

(2) The substance itself is

(3) Our experience of the substratum
or substance is confined to its

What the substance or
qualities
substratum itself is remains
hidden .18
.

This use of "substratum" takes its meaning from the

original Latin word for substance (that is, from

which means "I stand under,

I

support").

I

"

substo "

am attributing

to Spinoza a modified version of the "substratum" view

presented above.

I

am claiming that for Spinoza, a

substance is a thing in which a variety of properties
18.

"Substratum", in Classical and Contemporary Metaphysics ed. R. De George (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962), 157-

M. Lazerowitz,

,
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inhere, as (1) previously stated, and which is distinct

from the sum of those properties (2).

Spinoza departs

from the traditional "substratum” view in that he does not
hold the third criterion.

For Spinoza, the experience we

have of the properties of substance does provide us with

knowledge of the substance itself.

Unlike Locke, substance

is not an "I know not what" which supports qualities.

our intellect perceives the essence of substance

attributes), substance is truly perceived.

(

i .e

When
.

,

the

Hence our per-

ception of the attributes of substance does provide us

with knowledge of substance

.

Other scholars, such as Curley and Pollock, disagree.

They believe that Spinoza holds what is called a "bundle"

view of substance

.

According to their interpretation of

Spinoza, a substance is nothing more than the bundle of its

properties.

Pollock makes this claim in the following

statement
If we think of Spinoza's Substance as
distinct from and underlying the attributes... we shall certainly go wrong...
Substance consists of the attributes -jq
y
and has no reality other than theirs.

Curley expresses this same thought when he says, "Substance
simply is the sum of its attributes."

20

Their claim is

Pollock. Spinoza His Life and Philosophy (London:
Duckworth, 1899 ) 152
F.

:

>

20

.

Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics

,

91-
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based on a misconception regarding the nature of substance
and its attributes, which shall be discussed in Chapter VI.
In addition to the characterization of "substance"

quoted above, Spinoza makes other statements regarding
the nature of a substance.

Curley addresses himself to

these additional statements and errs here as well.

For

example, he claims that Spinoza does not define a sub-

stance as a being whose essence involves existence, but

rather as a being that has no external cause. 21

Curley

thinks it follows from this definition of a substance,

by the principle of sufficient reason, that a substance
is also a being whose essence involves existence, but

that this is not part of its definition.

wrong.

Surely he is

Spinoza defines a substance as a being whose es-

sence involves existence.

He says,

"...as it has been

shown already that existence appertains to the nature of
substance, existence must necessarily be included in its

definition

"
.

.

22

.

Further, Curley disagrees with the majority of inter-

preters of Spinoza that the cause of its own exitence
(

i .e

.

,

substance) is the whole of nature.

Curley thinks,

rather, that what "substance" denotes is not the whole of

21

.

22.

Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics

Spinoza, Ethics

,

50*

,

40
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nature but only its active part— its primary elements.
His main support for this claim comes from the Short

Treatise

,

where Spinoza speaks of dividing the whole of

nature into Natura Naturans (God) and Natura Naturata
(the modes of God).

Once again Curley is mistaken.

As Williamson correctly points out, Natura Naturans and

Natura Naturata do not represent a division of the whole
of nature, but rather are two different ways of looking

at the whole of nature 24
I

think there can be little doubt that Spinoza did

indeed view substance as encompassing the whole of nature.
Conclusive evidence for this comes in proposition XV of
the Ethics

,

where Spinoza states:

"Whatever is, is in

God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived."

25

How can we understand this quotation except as saying that

everything, including the modes, is in substance such that

substance includes within itself the whole of nature

.

One

of the chief purposes of Spinoza's doctrine of God is to

avoid the mistake of having a sharp demarcation between
the infinite God and the finite world.

For this very rea-

son Spinoza makes extension an attribute of God.
23

.

24.

Spinoza, Short~Treatise

,

80

"On Curley's Interpretation of Spinoza," Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 51* No. 2,
Aug. 1973, 160.
R. K. Williamson,

,

25-

He tries

Spinoza, Ethics

,

55*
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to avoid philosophic dualism which presents an imma-

terial God over a material world.

Hence he does identi-

fy God with the whole of nature and not simply its active part

Williamson sees Curley's failure as his inability
to correctly bring out the distinction between nature

seen as active and nature seen as passive.

think,

I

however, that Curley's problem lies in his belief that

for Spinoza a substance cannot be composed of parts. ? 6

Believing so, Curley is unwilling to attribute to Spinoza
a doctrine that asserts the existence of at least two

parts to a substance, an active and a passive.

But,

Spinoza was not against the existence of parts in a substance

.

He was against parts in a substance which are

separable.

He believed that in actuality the parts of

a substance are inseparable from the substance

,

even

Substance can

though we can distinguish them in thought.

be conceived as having parts as long as those parts are
As Spinoza says,

viewed as homogeneous.

"

.

.

.

[We may]

conceive the whole of nature as one individual, whose
parts, that is, all bodies, vary in infinite ways without any change in the individual as a whole."

2 Z~.

Curley. Spinoza's Metaphysics

27

Spinoza, Ethics

.

,

96

.

,

163

27
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In summary, Spinoza followed a long line of think-

ers from Aristotle to Descartes in conceiving of a sub-

stance as an independent being.

He departed from those

thinkers when he defined a substance as something con-

ceived through itself alone.

Both of these definitions

have been shown to be problematic.

A substance,

for him,

is a substratum in which qualities inhere and it encom-

passes the whole of nature
the whole of nature,

.

Given substance encompasses

there is only one substance in the

universe, and that substance is God.
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CHAPTER

V

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUBSTANCE AND ATTRIBUTES

Statement of the De Vries Problem
The most devastating objection ever raised against

Spinoza's thesis that there is only one substance in the

universe is that raised by Spinoza's contemporary Simon
De Vries

De Vries,

in an important letter to Spinoza, quotes

a statement by Spinoza which reads:

...hence it is plain that, although two
attributes really distinct be conceived,
that is, one without the aid of the
other, we cannot therefore infer, that
they constitute two entities or two different substances. For it belongs to
the nature of substance
that each of its
attributes should be conceived through itself, though all the attributes it possesses exist simultaneously in it.l
,

As can be seen in this letter, Spinoza plainly states that
the diversity of the attributes does not conflict with his

belief that there is only one substance

.

De Vries is puz-

zled by this statement, and protests:
Here our master seems to assume, that
the nature of substance is so constituted, that it may have several attriBut this doctrine has not yet
butes
been proved, unless you refer to the
sixth definition, of absolutely infinite
.

1.

Spinoza, Correspondence

,

312.
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substance or God.
Otherwise, if it be
asserted that each substance has only
one attribute and I have two ideas of
two attributes, I may rightly infer
that, where there are two different
attributes, there are also different
substances .2
,

The important question De Vries raises can be repre-

sented in two different ways.
is the following:

[l] Spinoza says that there is only one

substance (proposition XIV )
and indivisible.

One way of representing it

and that substance is simple

,

He also says that substance

identical to its essence.

(or God) is

("The existence of God and his

essence are one and the same

o
." J
)

Spinoza further states

that the attributes constitute the essence of substance,

and that these attributes are infinite and distinct from
one another.

Since the attributes constitute the essence

of substance and there are an infinite number of attributes,

one infers that substance has an infinite number of distinct

essences.

Yet,

if substance has an infinite number of dis-

tinct essences and substance is identical to its essence,

how can there be only one substance?
A second way of representing the problem raised by
De Vries

(which is similar to the first), is the following:

[2] Spinoza says there is only one substance, and that sub-

stance is identical to its essence.

2

3

~.

.

Spinoza, Correspondence
Spinoza, Ethics

,

63

*

,

312

The implication is
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that there is only one essence of substance.

But Spinoza

also states the attributes constitute the essence of substance, and these attributes are infinite and distinct

from one another.

The implication is that substance has

an infinite number of distinct essences.

This obviously

is inconsistent with the claim that substance has only

one essence

.

Although both [l] and [2] emanate from De Vries' criticism of Spinoza, De Vries specifically addresses problem
[l] when he states:

"...where there are two different

attributes, there are also different substances."

4

In response to De Vries' criticism Spinoza replies:
.by substance I mean that, which is in
itself and is conceived through itself;
that is, of which the conception does not
involve the conception of anything else
By attribute I mean the same thing, except that it is called attribute with respect to the understanding, which attributes to substance the particular nature
This definition, I repeat,
aforesaid.
explains with sufficient clearness what
I wish to signify by substance or attriYou desire, though there is no
bute
need, that I should illustrate by an example how one and the same thing can be
In order not to
stamped with two names
seem miserly, I will give you two .-5
.

.

.

,

.

Spinoza goes on to give as his example the names of Jacob
43

Spinoza. Correspondence

5.

Ibid.

,

315-316.

,

312
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and Israel in order to illustrate his point that the same
thing can have two different names
The curious part of Spinoza's reply to De Vries (as
/•

Alan Donagan correctly points out

),

is that it completely

misses the point of De Vries' question.

Spinoza is asked

by De Vries for a clearer explanation of how one and the
same substance can have more than one attribute

.

Spinoza

is asked to show why the multiplicity of the attributes

does not jeopardize the oneness of substance.

All Spinoza

does in his reply is reiterate once again his definitions
of substance and attribute, and show how one and the same

thing can be designated by two names.

De Vries,

however,

does not indicate any difficulty in understanding how one

and the same thing can have different names.

Further,

since in both of Spinoza's examples of different names for
the same thing he designates modes not attributes, he doubly

avoids answering De Vries' protest.
The majority of Spinoza scholars have considered De

Vries' objection an insoluble problem.

Joachim, for example,

has stated:
We must therefore admit that there is a
serious defect in Spinoza's general theory
The unity of
of the nature of Reality.

Substance which seemed so absolute--the
unity which was more than the unity of a

Donagan
A
in Spinoza
.

,

,

"Essence and the Distinction of Attributes,"
168
ed
M. Grene
,

.
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sys tem--resolves itself into a mere
"togetherness" of an infinite multiplicity. The Reality falls apart
into a substratum without charac-

ter
J.

... 7

Martineau, in agreement with Joachim states:
How that essence can be one and selfidentical, while its constituents are
many, heterogeneous and unrelated, is
a question which is hopeless of solution.
If they have nothing in common
with one another, how can the essences
which they express help being different? And if the essence is the same
how can they be aliens in nature. ?°

I

intend to show that this is not an insoluble problem.

Statement of the Leibniz Problem
As seen in Chapter IV, Spinoza defines a substance as

that which is in itself and conceived through itself.

Spi-

noza further explains that to be conceived through itself

means to be in need of the conception of no other thing in
In Chapters II and III

order for itself to be conceived.

it is shown that the attributes are related to substance

in the sense that they are the things out of which the es-

sence of substance is composed.

These two definitions bring forth a second problem
that Spinoza scholars have had to reconcile

problem.

— the

Leibniz

Leibniz holds that Spinoza's definition of a
104.

f.

Joachim, A Study

8.

Martineau, A Study of Spinoza

,

,

185*
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substance involves an inconsistency with his definition of
an attribute.

Leibniz states this objection in the follow-

ing:

[Spinoza says in his definition of an
attribute that] an attribute is perceived by the intellect as constituting
the essence of substance.
Therefore,
the concept of the attribute is necessary to form the concept of substance
If you say that an attribute is not a
thing and that you really require only
that a substance does not need the concept of any other thing, I answer that
you must explain what may be called a
thing, so that we may understand the
definition and understand in what way
an attribute is not a thing.
The objection Leibniz raises can be represented in

Spinoza defines a substance as a thing

the following way:

that does not need the conception of any other thing in

order to be conceived.

He also states that the attributes

"constitute the essence of substance

."

10

Since we cannot

conceive anything without conceiving its essence, we cannot conceive a substance without conceiving its attributes.
But,

if the conception of an attribute is needed in order

to conceive a substance, how can Spinoza claim that a sub-

stance is conceived through itself alone?
I

intend to investigate the possibility of resolving

the Leibniz and De Vries problems.

9

10

.

.

G. W.

Leibniz, as quoted in Curley, Spinoza's Metaphy-

sics

16

,

.

Spinoza, Ethics

,

45-
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Curley's Thesis

Although not mentioned in Curley's book, Spinoza's
Metaphysics

,

his thesis is strikingly similar to the the-

sis arrived at by Joseph Ratner in his book Spinoza on God

(New York: Henry Holt, 1930).

The thesis is:

and its attributes are one and the same thing.

substance

Curley

asks precisely v/hat Spinoza means when he states that a

substance is in itself and conceived through itself.

Cur-

ley contends that the majority of Spinoza scholars are mis-

taken in their interpretation of Spinoza's definitions.
He then proceeds to show how he understands those defini-

tions

.

Curley claims that most Spinoza scholars, thinking

Spinoza "a great Cartesian," suppose that he uses the terms
"substance" and "attribute" in a way similar to Descartes.

According to Curley, "...this view, for all its initial
plausibility, is a

mistake."'*''''

Whereas Descartes thinks

of a substance as something different from its attributes,

"Spinoza, unlike Descartes, does identify substance with
its attributes."

12

It is important to clarify what Curley means when he

says that substance is identical to "its" attributes, or

11.

Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics

12.

Ibid

.

16

,

14
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rather with the "totality" of its attributes.

This is not

an easy task, however, since Curley never explains his

meaning
Initially, it appears that Curley is suggesting that

substance, for Spinoza, is identical with each of its in-

finite attributes.

He states,

for example, that "It is

not that an attribute is not a thing, but that it is not

another thing. J

(That is, not different from substance.)

It seems obvious, however,

that it would be a mistake for

Curley to hold this, for given the attributes are distinct
for Spinoza this interpretation results in a contradiction.
Let, for example, x stand for substance and y and

attributes.

The following then results:

(3y ) (Az .Ay .z/y .y=x

identicals, z=y.

.

z=x

) )

.

(x)

z

for

(Sx^ (3z)

But, by the substitutivity of

Curley could, of course, avoid the above

contradiction by claiming that no two attributes are really
distinct for Spinoza.

This does not work, however, since

as is seen in Chapter III, Spinoza explicitly claims that
the attributes are infinite and distinct from one another.

Curley apparently recognizes this problem.

He cor-

rects his statement from, "substance is identical to its

attributes," to "substance is identical with the totality
IJT

Curley, Spinoza’s Metaphysics

,

16

.

(Underlining mine

.
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of its attributes." 14

Later he says that substance is

identical to the "sum" of its attributes:
simply is the sum of its attributes." 1 ^

"For substance
Now,

it seems,

Curley is thinking of the attributes as constituting some

kind of whole.

He appears to mean by "totality" that

which he means by "sum".

But what exactly is the meaning

of "totality" or "sum" in this context?

Does it mean that

substance is identical with the set or class of all the

attributes--that
set?

therefore, substance is some kind of

,

Curley makes statements in his book which would lead

one to believe that he does take words such as "totality"
to designate sets.

that,

For example, at one point he says

"...general propositions

..

.attribute a property or

a relation to all or some members of some class of indi-

vidual objects."

1^

If this is what Curley means by "to-

tality", then he is mistaken in attributing this view to

Spinoza.

With this view, a substance becomes some kind

of abstract entity, which Spinoza obviously does not hold.

With respect to the existence of substance, Spinoza is
operating within a realist tradition.

He appears to regard

the concept of "substance" as an Aristotelian would

14
15
16

.

Curley, Spinoza’s Metaphysics

.

Ibid.

.

Ibid., 50.

,

(Underlining mine.)
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that is, as an idea which refers to a particular concrete

thing or individual existing in reality.

Since Spinoza

handles the problem of universals by attributing our general
ideas to operations of the imagination which do not refer
to general abstract entities existing in reality (as

shown in Chapter II), there is no reason to suppose he

would be happy with a view of substance which makes it
an abstract entity.
Since "totality" cannot signify some kind of set,

what does it signify?

Perhaps we can arrive at Curley's

meaning by thinking of his view as something like that

which

I

have called interpretation #111 in Chapter III.

That Is, we could think of Curley's claim that substance
is identical to the "sum" of its attributes as a claim

which states that substance is identical to the collection or bundle of its properties.

On this view one is

not thinking of substance as some kind of abstract entity,

but simply as the bundle of all of its attributes.

The bundle itself is not something over and above the sum

of its parts.

The major difference then between Curley's

claim and mine (in Chapter III) is that Curley claims
that the collection or bundle of the attributes is the

substance, whereas

I

claim that the collection of the

attributes is simply the essence of substance, that which

uniquely individuates the substance, not the substance

98

itself.

Substance is something more than the "sum" or

bundle of its essential properties.
In interpretation #111

I

argue that substance is com-

posed of essential and accidental properties.

Each attri-

bute is an essential property of a substance, whereas the

totality of the attributes is the essence of substance.
A mode is an accidental property of substance

.

If the

above is Curley’s claim, then he argues that the bundle
of the attributes is the substance, for, an attribute is

not "another thing" different from the substance

.

A puz-

zle resulting from this interpretation of Curley's claim
is that the attributes are not only infinite for Spinoza,

but only two are known, namely, extension and thought.
Substance, however, is known to all.

If substance is iden-

tical to its attributes, why are those infinite attributes

unknown?
Further,

I

am puzzled as to why Curley claims that

substance is identical to "its" attributes.
"its" mean here?

What does

Usually we would fill out the meaning

of "its" as expressing the thought that substance is iden-

tical to the totality of attributes that it has.

This

points to some kind of substratum view such as the one

discussed in Chapter IV.

On this view substance is in

some sense a haver of qualities.

But,

the substratum

view is exactly the view Curley is anxious to refute by
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positing the identity of substance with "its" attributes.
Curley states:

Neither his modes nor his attributes
can exist in substance as in a subject, they do not inhere in substance.
For the attributes do not exist in anything other than themselves, and the
modes are themselves the sort of thing
that would properly be the subject of
predication .17
Since the use of the word "its" here is misleading because
it suggests a substratum view,

it would have been better

had Curley simply stated that substance is identical to
the attributes
In conclusion, it is not clear what Curley's thesis

about the identity of substance with "its" attributes is

meant to convey.

And, obviously, the correctness of Cur-

ley's thesis depends upon how one interprets his claim.

Curley offers his thesis that substance is identical
to "its" attributes as an easy solution to the problem

raised by Leibniz.

Curley feels that Leibniz' objection

is valid only if Spinoza holds that substance is not iden-

tical to its attributes.

If,

however, claims Curley,

Spinoza does believe that substance is identical to its

attributes, there is no real problem.

Of course,

the

conception of the attributes is necessary for the conception of substance if they are one and the same thing.
17.

Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics

,

18.
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Given substance and its attributes are the same thing,

having to conceive the attributes in order to conceive
substance does not falsify the claim that a substance is
a thing

conceived through itself alone.

Curley says:

The objection Leibniz makes here is
natural enough, from a Cartesian standpoint, but the hypothetical reply he is
led to put in Spinoza's mouth is wrongheaded.
It is not that an attribute is
not a thing, but that it is not another
thing .18
So, according to Curley, Leibniz'

objection does not hold,

and hence there is no inconsistency.
Curley's thesis does enable Spinoza to avoid the objection raised by Leibniz.

Although positing the identi-

ty of substance and its attributes does solve the Leibniz

problem, it must be asked whether Spinoza can on Curley's

interpretation circumvent De Vries' objection that if there
is more than one attribute there must be more than one

substance

.

One might claim that De Vries' objection to Spinoza
is doubly acute if Curley's interpretation of Spinoza is

accurate
butes).

(

i .e

,

that substance is identical to its attri-

For, if there is only one substance, and the at-

tributes of that substance are exactly the same as the substance, and if as Spinoza claims two distinct attributes
18.

Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics

,

16
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may be conceived one without the help of the other, how
can it be asserted that this does not constitute two dif-

ferent substances?

If substance is identical to its at-

tributes and there are infinitely many distinct attributes,
it would seem there must be infinitely many distinct sub-

stances.

This, however, contradicts Spinoza's explicit

statement in proposition XIV that there is only one substance in the universe
One solution to this dilemma for Curley might be for

him to claim that between any two attributes there can only be a

"

distinctio rationis "

.

In otherwords, he could

claim that there can no more be a real plurality of divine
attributes than there can be a real plurality of divine
substances.

This is how Wolf son interprets Spinoza.

Ac-

cording to Wolfson, the attributes are not really distinct
in substance proper, for they are not really in substance
at all.

It is the intellect which perceives the attributes

as distinct, and, it is only in the intellect that the at-

tributes have any kind of existence.
"

The

..

Wolfson claims that,

.attributes appear to the mind as being distinct

from each other.

In reality, however, they are one."

Wolfson, however, is mistaken.

19

Spinoza did not sim-

ply hold that the attributes appear to be distinct, but
19.

Wolfson, Spinoza Vol.

I,

156
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that they are distinct.
in Part

I

This is evident in proposition X

of the Ethics where he claims,

"Each particular

attribute of the one substance must be conceived through
itself."

20

He also states in the same proposition that

the attributes are in fact conceived as distinct, and

that we can in fact conceive the one without the help of
the other.

It is not, therefore,

that the attributes

appear to be distinct but that they are and must be distinct.

As Donagan correctly points out,

"...Spinoza was

committed to the position that God, the absolutely infi•

nite substance, has really distinct attributes."

21

Also,

Wolfson is wrong in claiming that although the attributes
are conceived by us as distinct, they are not really so in

substance itself.

As seen in Chapter II, what the intel-

lect perceives concerning substance (or anything else for
that matter), it perceives truly.

Hence, Curley cannot

avoid De Vries' objection to Spinoza by claiming that between any two attributes there can only be a

"

distinctio

rationis "
Initially then, it seems, that Curley cannot circumvent De Vries' objection by holding that substance, for
Spinoza, is identical to its attributes.

If for every

20.

Spinoza, Ethics'

21.

Donagan, "Essence and the Distinction of Attributes,"
in Spinoza M. Grene ed., 173

,

50

•

-

,

,
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distinct attribute there corresponds a distinct essence,
and if the essence of substance is one, it seems substance

cannot be identical to its attributes
It is at this point that the previous discussion of

the notion of "essence” in Chapter III becomes crucial.
For,

if Curley holds that Spinoza's attributes are not

distinct essences, but are each only essential properties

which together constitute the essence of substance, then
Curley's interpretation can avoid De Vries' objection.
otherwords, if Curley holds what

I

In

call interpretation #111,

and therefore claims that the totality of the attributes

constitutes the one and only one essence of substance,
the oneness of substance is preserved.

It is preserved be-

cause with this view each attribute is not a distinct essence, but rather a distinct essential property of sub-

stance

.

Essential properties can be distinct without jeo-

pardizing the unity of substance.
If,

however, Curley holds what

I

have called inter-

pretation #1 or #11, he cannot avoid De Vries' objection.
Both of these interpretations attribute to Spinoza the

view that each attribute is an essence which uniquely individuates.

In both interpretation #1 and #11,

"attribute"

or "essence" as it applies to substance uniquely indivi-

duates.

If each attribute is an essence then Curley cannot

claim, as he must if he is to avoid De Vries' objection,
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that the totality of the attributes constitutes the one

essence of substance

Curley could, therefore, circumvent De Vries' objection:

He could claim that the attributes are essen-

tial properties of substance which together constitute
the one essence of substance

Even though Curley can avoid De Vries' objection to
Spinoza,

I

will show in Chapter VI that Curley's thesis

is mistaken.

Substance is not identical to its attributes.

105

CHAPTER

VI

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE LEIBNIZ AND DE VRIES PROBLEMS
The relationship of Curley's thesis to both the pro-

blem raised by De Vries and the problem raised by Leibniz
has now been presented.

As seen in Chapter V, Curley's

interpretation of Spinoza offers a solution to the pro-

blem raised by Leibniz.

Also, depending on how one inter-

prets Curley's claim, his interpretation either provides

more support for De Vries' objection, or offers a solution to it.
For any interpretation to provide a solution to various problems, it must first be correct itself.

Is Cur-

ley's claim that, for Spinoza, substance is identical to
its attributes correct?

I

will attempt to show that the

support he offers for his claim fails to establish it,

and that his interpretation is incorrect.
Curley's several reasons for his belief that substance
is identical to its attributes must be examined.

Before

examining these, however, it should be mentioned that an
easy way of refuting Curley's position is to hold a "subjective" view of the attributes.

The question of v/hether

substance is identical to its attributes is easily an-

swered if one holds, along with Wolf son and others, that

what we perceive as the attributes of substance has no
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reality outside the perceiving intellect.
of course, no.

The answer is,

If the attributes are "subjective” in

Wolfson's sense they have no real connection with substance.

If the attributes are "subjective", and if sub-

stance is identical to its attributes, then substance is

also "subjective"

(

i .e

.

,

substance also has no reality

outside the perceiving intellect).
bute this view to Spinoza.

No scholar could attri-

It is surprising,

therefore,

that Curley neglects the "sub jectivist/ob jectivist" issue
in his treatment of Spinoza.

Curley must show why the

"subjectivists" are wrong and the "ob jectivists" are

right to defend his position.
I

He is silent on this issue.

have shown in Chapter II that there is substantially

more evidence in favor of the "ob jectivist" position.

Cur-

ley's thesis cannot be rejected easily by proclaiming the

"subjective" basis of the attributes and the "objective"
basis of substance.

His thesis cannot be rejected on

this ground until further evidence can be presented to

support the "subjectivist" claim.
to be rejected,

If Curley's thesis is

it must be on other grounds.

The evidence

he gives to support his claim that substance is identical
to its attributes must be examined.

Initially there seems to be a great deal of evidence
to support Curley's claim.

vincing,

I

Although the evidence is con-

maintain that Curley’s position is mistaken.
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First, he offers three quotations from the Ethics
and one

from the Correspondence to support his view.

Second, he

attempts to show that the two defining characteristics
of a substance apply also to the attributes.

I

will show

l) that none of the quotations Curley gives to
support

his thesis prove what he thinks they prove, and
2) that
the proof he gives to demonstrate that the properties of

substance are also properties of the attributes is inadequate

To prove

.

that the attributes are identical to

substance Curley must show, by the identity of indiscernibles

,

that every property of the attributes is also a

property of substance, and vice versa

.

This,

I

contend,

he is unable to do

First,

the various quotations given by Curley to

support his thesis must be examined.

from the Ethics

Two of them are

:

God is eternal, or all of his attributes
are eternal.

God is immutable or all of his attributes are immutable .2
,

When first read, these quotations certainly do seem to
provide Curley with support for the view that substance
is identical to its attributes.

1.

Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics

2.

Ibid.

Spinoza seems to be

,

17-
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equating God with his attributes

Since God and sub-

.

stance are identical for Spinoza, it seems as though

substance and its attributes are identical.

The reason

these quotations appear to support Curley's claim is be-

cause of the word "or”

Translators other than Curley

.

have translated these quotations in quite a different
way.

The Elwes'

translation, for example, renders the

above quotations as follows:
God, and all the attributes of God,
are eternal.

God, and all the attributes of God,
are unchangeable.^
The Elwes'

translation makes a very different impression

than Curley's.

suggests that substance is not

The Elwes'

identical to its attributes, either singly or collectiveIt suggests that not only God is eternal and immu-

ly.

table, but all his attributes are eternal and immutable

also

.

If the original Latin is examined,

Proposition XIX,

literal translation is easily solved.
for example, reads as follows:

attributa sunt aeterna

Spinoza, Ethics 7 62.

4.

Ibid

5

B.

.

.

,

63

.

Deus

Opera

sive omnia Dei

(Underlining mine.)

(Underlining mine.)

De Spinoza,

,

It is clear that when one

.

3^

"

the problem of

I

,

54.
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translates the original Latin literally, the Elwes'

translation is wrong and Curley’s is correct.

The word

translated by the one as "or" and the other as "and" is
the word

"

sive "

.

"

In Latin

sive " is definitely "or".

Curley, therefore, appears to be right in his translation.

It should be mentioned, however, that there is

some justification for a reading of this proposition

using the word "and" and not "or" (that is, for a nonliteral translation)
In the demonstration to proposition XX Spinoza says,
zT

"

Deus

,

e

jusque omnia attri but a sunt aeterna

.

"

This

states that God and all his attributes are eternal.

Latin word

"

e

jusque " is used, and

"

e

The

jusque " means "and".

In stating this proposition Spinoza refers back to pro-

position XIX as stating the same thing.

The Elwes*

trans-

lation, therefore, does appear to have support for the
use of "and" in proposition XIX, instead of "or".

What Spinoza really seems to mean in the above two

quotations cited by Curley is that both God and all his

attributes are eternal.

The reason these two quotations

appear to support Curley is because we are reading the "or"
as saying something like "or what is the same thing."

It

is not necessary, nor is there any good reason to read the

B.

De Sninoza,

Opera

I

,

55
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"or”

(

sive

" )

in this way.

Spinoza could he saying that

by virtue of the conditional (that for any substance if
a ll

attributes are eternal then it is eternal), the

two disjuncts are the same thing.
.

"or" of repetition.

He could be using the

The "or" could also be read as sig-

nifying an inclusive disjunction.

If it signifies an

inclusive disjunction, Spinoza is simply saying that

either God is eternal or all his attributes are eternal,
or both are eternal.

The inclusive sense of "or" is a

very plausible reading of proposition XIX.
In summary,

there is no reason for reading the "or"

in the above two quotations in a way which gives support
to Curley's thesis.

The only support that would give

credibility to Curley's reading of "or" in these statements is if we already accepted the claim that substance
is identical to its attributes.

Other quotations from the Ethics (not given by Curley),

support my interpretation.

One example is proposi-

tion XXVIII:

Wherefore it must follow from, or be
conditioned for, existence and action
by God or one of his attributes, in so
far as the latter are modified by some
modification which is finite, and has
a conditioned existence
.

7.

Spinoza, Ethics

,

67*

Ill

in this quotation Spinoza dofinitoly separates an
attri-

bute from God by signifying something about the latter
(an attrioute

)

former (God).
I

,

which he does not wish to signify by the
True,

only one attribute is mentioned, but

think that Spinoza would be equally willing to apply

this to all the attributes collectively.

What Spinoza

refers to is the fact that the infinite gives rise to the
finite through the attributes, not through substance di-

rectly.

He means that the modes follow either from the

attributes of God directly, or from the attributes as
they are modified by the modes

— not

directly from sub-

stance itself.
The third quotation Curley gives from the Ethics
to support this thesis is:

There is nothing outside the intellect
by which several things can be distinguished from one another, except substances, or what is the same thing,
g
their attributes, and their affections.
It appears from this quotation that Spinoza identifies

substance with its attributes

what Spinoza means by "or"
thing."

.

.

Here there is no question

He means "or what is the same

But if one looks closely at this quotation it can

be seen that Spinoza not only says the attributes are the

same thing as substance, but that the affections are also.
The term "affections", for Spinoza, is simply another name

8.

Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics

,

16
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for'

term

"the

modes

Certainly Curley does not want

to claim that Spinoza identifies substance with its

modes

Substance is what is conceived through itself

.

and what is in itself, whereas the modes are the modifi-

cations of substance, or what exist in and are conceived

through something other than themselves.

If Curley is

going to claim that this quotation supports the identi-

fication of substance with its attributes, he is going
to have to show why,

then,

it does not support the identi-

fication of substance with its modes.

Spinoza probably

wants to indicate by this quotation his belief that everything is either an attribute or a mode of the one substance

(

i .e

.

,

"Everything which exists, exists either in

itself or in something else."^).

Curley also gives a quotation from the Correspondence

which he thinks defends his thesis

He feels this quo-

.

tation shows that Spinoza defines a substance and its

attributes in the same way.

He,

therefore, concludes they

The quotation is:

must be identical.

I understand whatever is
itself and in itself,
through
conceived
conception
of it does not inso that the
volve the conception of another thing. 10

By attribute

While initially this quotation also appears to support

9

.

10.

Spinoza, Ethics

,

46.

Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics

,

17
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Curley's thesis, on closer inspection it does not.

It

must be recognized that in this quotation Spinoza gives
only a property of an attribute and not a definition of
an attribute
IV,

Part

.

This has already been given in definition

of the Ethics

I

.

Further, he only ascribes to

an attribute half of the properties he gives to a substance in the definition of a substance.

He says that

the attributes are conceived through themselves and in

themselves.

He does not say that the attributes are in

themselves, but rather, are conceived in themselves.

All

Spinoza says is that the attributes share with substance
the fact that they too are conceived through themselves.

This is not a surprising thing for Spinoza to say, since
he states directly in the Ethics that being conceived

through itself is a property of an attribute

:

"Each

particular attribute of the one substance must be conceived through itself.

In otherwords, all Spinoza

asserts is that substance and its attributes share a

common property.

If two things share the same property,

it does not follow that they are identical.

Curley must

show that substance and its attributes share all their

properties.

The above quotation fails to show this.

None of the quotations Curley gives successfully support

his thesis
11.

.

Spinoza, Ethics

,

50.
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Curley, recognizing that to support his thesis he

must show that substance and its attributes have all
their properties in common, attempts to do this.

He

tries to show that Spinoza, in giving one half of his

definition of substance in the theorem that every attribute must be conceived through itself, provides us with
the other half.

Curley says, since it is the case for

Spinoza that the attributes must be conceived through
themselves, it is not difficult to construct a proof
that what is conceived through itself must be in itself.
The proof Curley gives for this is in reductio form, and
is as follows:

(I

have written out the premises more

precisely than Curley in order to see his proof better.)
1.

X is conceived through itself/
X is in itself

2.

X does not exist in itself

3*

X exists in something else

4.

If X exists in something else,
knowledge of X would depend on
knowledge of that in which it
existed

5

If knowledge of X depends on
that in which it existed, then
X is not conceived through itself

•

6.

X is not conceived through itself

®
7

12

.

6,1

X is in itselr

2

Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics

,

17-18.
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What can be said about this proof?

obviously valid.

First, it is

However, are the premises such that

Spinoza would have held them all to be true?

certainly holds premise
ment that,

1,

as can be seen by his state-

"Each particular attribute of the one sub-

stance must be conceived through itself." 1 ^

holds premise

"Everything
else."

Spinoza

14

..

3>

He also

lor he gives us one of his axioms that,

.exists either in itself or in something

Since it is given that X does not exist in

itself (premise

2,

where X is obviously an attribute),

it must (by the above axiom) exist in something else.
Is premise 4 true?

this premise?

What is Curley's justification for

He gives as his justification for premise

4 an axiom in the Ethics

(#4) which states,

"The know-

ledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge
pc
of a cause." J

In order for axiom #4 to be the justi-

fication for premise 4, however, Curley must feel that
Spinoza would accept the following premise (call it
premise 4

'

)

For anything, if it exists in something else, then it must exist as an
effect of which that something else
is its cause
.

13.

Spinoza, Ethics

14

Ibid

15

.

•

Ibid

.

,

46.

,
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In otheiwords,

the proof Curley gives must be expanded:

8.

If X is in Y,
of X

9-

If Y is the cause of
an effect of Y

then Y is the cause
X,

then X is

10.

Knowledge of an effect depends on
knowledge of its cause

11.

X is in Y

12

Knowledge of X depends on knowledge

.

of Y

Would Spinoza hold, as Curley claims he does, that
if X is in Y,

then Y is the cause of X

noza hold 4')?

(

i .e

.

,

If Spinoza would not hold 4',

would Spithen Cur-

ley's justification for premise 4 in the original proof
fails, and, hence, his entire proof for the proposition

that if X is conceived through itself X is in itself, is

not acceptable

.

In order to determine if premise 4' is true for

Spinoza, it is necessary to understand what he means when
he says something is in something else

.

I

have suggested

in Chapter IV that Spinoza means by "in itself" and "in

another" something like that which Aristotle meant when
he said,

"Some things can exist apart and some cannot and

it is the former that are substances."

l6

.

l6

In otherwords

Aristotle, Metaphysics XII, 5» 1070b, 36-1071a, I,
in Introduction to Aristotle Richard McKeon, ed.
(New York: Modern Library, 1947), 279.
,

,
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substances can exist on their own.

Aristotle and Spinoza

seem to be suggesting that there is some kind of dependence

relationship involving attributes and substance
in itself" Spinoza means the following:

(s

)

By

.

something

which does not depend on anything else for its existence
or being.

By "in another" Spinoza suggests just the

opposite notion:

something which depends on something

else for its existence or being.

example,

When Spinoza says, for

"Whatsoever is, is in God ...," 1

7
'

he is saying,

as Parkinson points out, that "...all things depend on

God

.”
.

18

.

Hence,

in order for Spinoza to hold that if X is

in Y, then Y is the cause of X, he would have to hold

that all dependence relations are causal.

hold this?

Would Spinoza

There is no good reason to attribute this

doctrine to him.

Actually, Spinoza would probably agree

that there are some dependence relations that are not

causal.

Without good reason, one should not attribute

to a thinker a doctrine so obviously false as the one

which would have all dependence relations causal.

With-

out doubt something can exist in something else without

17

*

18

.

Spinoza, Ethics

,

55

*
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,
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having that in which it exists as its cause.

For exam-

ple, could not Spinoza hold that while X is in Y,
the cause of X, not Y?

Z

is

For Spinoza the mind most defi-

nitely depends on the body (the mind cannot exist without
the body), yet it is God not the body that is the cause
of the mind.

Curley has no justification, therefore,

for holding that Spinoza would affirm the truth of premise 4, which states that if X exists in something else,

knowledge of X would depend on knowledge of that in

which it exists

.

It might be argued that although the justification

Curley gives for the truth of premise 4 does not give
its truth, it still is the case that Spinoza would hold

premise 4 true

.

It might be said that there is other

evidence which would support the view that Spinoza accepts

what premise 4 asserts.

For example, in talking about

the modifications of substance Spinoza states,

"...modi-

fications exist in something external to themselves, and
a conception of them is formed by means of a conception
of the thing in which they exist."

y

This sounds like

knowledge of what exists in something else does depend
on knowledge of that something else

.

I

think it is im-

portant to note, however, the word "external", and understand
19.

Spinoza, Ethics

,

49*
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that Spinoza refers to things which exist in some-

thing external to themselves.

Though

I

think it true

for Spinoza that the attributes do exist in substance,
it is not the case that substance is something external
to its attributes in the way in which it might be said

that the modes are something external to substance
sense of "external"

non-essential.

The

.

have in mind is that which means

I

The attributes,

in this sense, are not

external to substance because they are that which express
its essence

stance (as

.

I

They are the essential properties of subhave shown earlier).

Although the modes

are in substance also, they are outside its essence, and

hence external in the above sense.

The modes, as every-

thing else, are in God, but not essential to God.

The

attributes, however, belong to the essence of substance,

and as such they are "...that without which the thing
[substance], and which itself without the thing, can

neither be nor be conceived."

20

So it appears to be the

case, at least as far as the attributes are concerned,

that if they are in something else (such as substance)

they still can be conceived in themselves.

They can and

are conceived through themselves because they are the

essential properties of the thing in which they exist.
20.

Spinoza, Ethics

,

82.
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Spinoza holds both that the attributes are in substance
and they are conceived through themselves.
this when he says,

He states

"...it is the nature of substance that

each of its attributes is conceived through itself, inas-

much as all the attributes it has have always existed

simultaneously in it

...

21

It is because the attributes

are in substance as its essential properties that they
are conceived through themselves

Reasons have been presented to show that the evidence Curley presents to support the thesis that substance
is identical to its attributes fails.

In doing this

I

have suggested some reasons to believe that Spinoza did

not identify the two

.

A further reason for believing

that he did not equate substance with "its" attributes
is contained in the following quotation from the Ethics

:

.to perfect the understanding is
nothing else but to understand God,
God's attributes, and the actions
which follow from the necessity of
his nature .22
.

.

Here Spinoza definitely separates God from his attributes.

What we have seen so far, then, is that all of the
evidence Curley presents for his thesis fails.

He has

been unable to provide any solid evidence for holding
that substance is identical to "its" attributes.

21.

Spinoza, Ethics

22.

Ibid., 237-

,

51-

(Underlining mine

.
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the quotations he presents, nor the proof he gives, accom-

plish his purpose

.

Reconsideration of the Leibniz Problem
As shown previously, Curley offers his thesis that

substance is identical to its attributes as an easy solution to the problem raised by Leibniz
that Curley's thesis is mistaken.

I

have now shown

It cannot, therefore,

objection to Spinoza.

be used to combat Leibniz'

question remains:

.

The

Does Spinoza have an answer to Leibniz?

First, is Leibniz correct in drawing the inference
from,

"...an attribute is perceived by the intellect as

constituting the essence of substance," to "...the concept of an attribute is necessary in order to form the
23
concept of substance?" J

It might easily be maintained

that one cannot conclude that knowledge of x is necessary

for the conception of y simply from the fact that x con-

stitutes the essence of y

.

Could not Spinoza claim that

in holding the attributes constitute the essence of sub-

stance, he is not therefore committed to hold that the

attributes must be conceived In order for substance to be
conceived?

The answer to this depends on how Spinoza de-

fines "essence".
23^

Leibniz, as quoted in Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics
16

.

,

122

If the definition of "essence" is examined again,
it can be seen that for anything (y) to belong to the

essence of a thing (x), it must be the case that the
thing (x) cannot be conceived without it (y)
butes, therefore

The attri-

(since they constitute the essence of a

substance), are that without which the substance can

neither be nor be conceived

.

Leibniz is correct to hold

that, given that the attributes constitute the essence
of the substance,

they must be conceived in order for

the substance to be conceived.

This being so, he is

correct to challenge Spinoza to show how a substance
can be defined as a thing conceived through itself alone.

How might Spinoza reply to Leibniz?

One answer

Spinoza might give is one that is suggested by Leibniz
himself.

After criticizing Spinoza for having an incon-

sistency in his definition of "substance" and "attribute",
Leibniz further says,
If you say that an attribute is not a
thing and you really require only that
a substance does not need the concept
of any other thing, I answer that you
must explain what may be called a thing,
so that we may understand the definition
and understand in what way an attribute
is not a thing. 24

24.
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Based on

quotation of Leibniz

"this

it seems that

,

he is reading Spinoza's definition of "substance"
in the

following way:

x is a substance

df

=

x is in itself and

.

does not require the conception of any other thing.

If

this is the correct reading of Spinoza's definition, then
one possible way for Spinoza to answer Leibniz is as

follows
Spinoza could claim that the attributes are not
things, but rather properties of a certain kind of thing,

that is, an independent being called "substance".

He

could say all that is required for his definition of
"substance" is that it is in itself and does not need
the conception of any other thing

On this interpreta-

tion, Spinoza would be holding that there is only one

kind of thing

(

i .e

.

,

substances), and that all the other

objects in the universe are properties of these things
or substances.

They are either non-essential properties,

such as the modes, or essential properties, such as the

attributes.

Because substances are the only things,

having to conceive the attributes

(

i -e

.

,

the essential

properties) of those substances does not conflict with
the claim that a substance is conceived through itself
(if by that it is meant a substance does not require the

conception of any other thing )
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There are problems, however, with both Leibniz'
in-

terpretation of Spinoza's definition of "substance", and
with the above proposed solution to this interpretation,
ihe above proposed solution to Leibniz

'

interpretation

of Spinoza s definition makes that definition either cir-

cular or uninformative.

According to the above solution

there is only one kind of thing in the universe

substances).

(

j

,

e

.

,

A substance is conceived through itself

if it does not require the conception of any other thing.

Neither attributes nor modes qualify as "other things,"
since they are not things but properties

.

What is left

to qualify as "another thing" according to the definition

of "substance"?

For Spinoza, the only objects in the

universe are either modes, attributes or substances.
("Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in

something else."

J

The only objects left then to quali-

)

fy as "any other thing" are other substances.

If we read

Spinoza’s definition of "substance" filling in "any other
thing" as any other substance, it then seems that Spinoza's

definition is circular

(

i

.

e

,

x is a substance

=

df

.

x is

in itself and does not require the conception of any other

substance).
25-

If his definition is not exactly circular,
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it is at the very least uninformative since we can still

ask what a substance is

Perhaps a more fruitful way for Spinoza to answer
Leibniz is to claim that Leibniz is misreading his defi-

nition of "substance".

Instead of reading his definition

of "substance" as x is a substance

=

df

.

x is in itself

and does not require the conception of any other thing,
it is more properly read as follows:

df

.

=

x is a substance

x is in itself and for any y where y / x, the con-

ception of x does not involve the conception of y.

This

reading of Spinoza's definition does not seem to lead to
circularity, nor does it appear to be uninformative.

In

this reading of Spinoza one construes "any other thing"
as "any other y," where y is a variable which can range

over any number of objects

.

The problem with this defi-

nition is that if the variable "y" is allowed

to range

over the attributes of a substance, then it seems Leibniz
is correct in stating that Spinoza's definition of "sub-

stance" is inconsistent with his definition of "attribute".
A substance cannot be conceived without its attributes.

Spinoza could claim that the variable "y" does not
range over the attributes of a substance.

Consequently,

he would mean that a substance with its attributes is

what is conceived through itself without the conception
of any other y.

The definition of "substance" would then
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read:

x is a substance = df

.

x is in itself and for any

y where y / x and y is not an attribute of x, the concep-

tion of x does not involve the conception of y

.

On this

interpretation "any other y" could be any number of things:
the attributes of other substances, modes,

etc.

Spinoza

could claim that it is only when one construes "any other
y" as ranging over the attributes of the substance that

there is an inconsistency between his definition of "sub-

stance" and his definition of "attribute".

Unfortunately this revised definition of "substance"
The revised definition of "substance"

also has problems.

makes use of the term "attribute".

Spinoza defines "at-

tribute" as that which constitutes "...the essence of

substance

.

"

The two definitions together are circular.

This investigation shows that all attempts to avoid
the inconsistency between Spinoza's definition of "sub-

stance" and his definition of "attribute"
ley's) involve him in circularity.

(excluding Cur-

Hence, it appears that

Spinoza does not have an answer to the Leibniz problem.

Spinoza, Ethics
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Solution to De Vries Problem
As mentioned earlier, Curley's interpretation can

avoid De Vries' objection if Curley holds interpretation

explicated in Chapter III

hold interpretation

if

.

Even though he could

III, and thereby avoid De Vries'

objection to Spinoza, it is shown in Chapter VI that
Curley's thesis is mistaken
to its attributes.

— substance

is not identical

Any interpretation of Spinoza which

is to avoid De Vries'

objection must hold something simi-

lar to interpretation #111

.

It must be held that for

Spinoza the attributes are singly essential properties,

which together constitute the one essence of substance.
It cannot be maintained that each attribute is an "es-

sence" without jeopardizing the unity and simplicity of

substance

.

Given the attributes are simply essential properties,
it seems Spinoza would have little difficulty meeting De

Vries' objection.

Why understand Spinoza as having

identified the essence of substance with each of its
defining attributes?

As soon as we uncover and reject

the buried premise in De Vries'

objection (that to every

distinct attribute there corresponds a really distinct
essence), the problem is dissolved.

Why should the mul-

tiplicity of the attributes jeopardize the oneness of

128

substance?

Cannot a single substance have many properties

v/ithout itself being many?

As long as Spinoza does not

hold that each attribute is an essence (in Plantinga's
sense),

I

cannot see that he has any real problem meet-

ing De Vries’ objection.

The weight of the issue is on

De Vries to show that it cannot be the case that one

substance has many essential properties. 2 7
In summary, a critique of Curley’s thesis has been

given, and an interpretation of Spinoza offered which

provides a possible solution to the De Vries' problem.
It has also been shown that Spinoza cannot avoid the

Leibniz problem.

27-

Donagan comes to this conclusion in his article,
"Essence and the Distinction of Attributes," in
Spinoza M. Grene ed., 164-181.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
In the beginning of Chapter I,

I

argue that in

order to understand proposition XIV (Spinoza's statement
of the claim that there is exactly one substance), it is

necessary to understand the argument Spinoza employs in
support of this claim.

It is pointed out that Spinoza's

argument in support of proposition XIV has three separate parts, none of which independently supports propo-

sition XIV.
substance;

Spinoza argues:

(1)

There is at least one

(2) one substance cannot produce or cause

another substance; and (3) there cannot be two self-caused
substances.
(2) and

(3)-

then present Spinoza's arguments for claims

I

In

the remainder of Chapter

I,

I

examine

some of the premises in the arguments for the claim that

there is only one substance, and show that without an un-

derstanding of certain key concepts ("attribute", "essence",
and "substance") embedded in the premises of the arguments,
the premises are unintelligible

In Chapter II through VI an analysis of the concepts
of "substance",

"attribute" and "essence" is presented.

The meaning of these concepts in the context of Spinoza's

system is shown.
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As previously seen, the discussion of "attribute"

and

essence

cannot be separated*

is employed in two senses.

The term "essence"

These senses are shown through,

1) an examination of the definition of "essence", and 2)

Spinoza's use of the term in various contexts.

The term

"essence" can mean either an essential property, or some-

thing which (in Plantinga's sense) "uniquely individuates."
Since Spinoza defines "attribute" as that which constitutes the essence of a substance, "attribute" also is

used in these two senses.

Whenever "attribute" signifies

an individual attribute, it means an essential property.

Whenever "attribute" signifies the collection of all the
individual attributes or essential properties, it (the
collection) uniquely individuates whatever has it.

In

otherwords, it (the collection) is something that can-

not be shared by two or more distinct individuals.
Apart from these two senses, it is discovered that
our ideas of the attributes represent true characterizations of substance, and are not simply mental constructs

which are incapable of revealing any true information
about a substance.
A substance,

for Spinoza, is a thing which is inde-

pendent of any other thing and is conceived without the
help of the conception of any other thing.

When "any

other thing" is filled out it is discovered that it must
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mean any other substance, and hence he has a circular
definition.

When Spinoza defines a substance as that

v/hich is conceived through itself alone,

he is correctly

challenged by Leibniz to show how this is possible given
that it is necessary to conceive the attributes in order
to conceive the substance.

With the above information now at hand, a better
and clearer examination of Spinoza’s arguments for pro-

position XIV is possible
Argument A is one of Spinoza's arguments for the
claim that one substance cannot be produced by another
substance.

gument

.

Premises

2,

4 and 6 are crucial in this ar-

A reconsideration of these in light of the bet-

ter understanding of Spinoza's central concepts clarifies

some issues which were previously problematic

.

Other

issues remain unresolved.
Premise 4.

Argument A.
Ethics )

(proposition II,

Two substances whose attributes are different have nothing in common.

In the proof for this premise, Spinoza restates his

definition of a substance (definition iii, Ethics I),
and claims that Premise 4 (proposition II ) follows from
this definition alone.

1.
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It is still unclear how Premise 4
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follows from definition iii without the inclusion of some

suppressed premise.

My conclusion is that Premise 4 is

nothing but a restatement of definition iii, and the
search for a suppressed premise is the wrong direction
to take

.

A more fruitful way to understand Premise 4

than searching for a suppressed premise, is to seek an

understanding of what Spinoza means when he says two
things have nothing in common.

When Spinoza says this he means the conception of
the one does not involve the conception of the other.

Premise 4 when filled out in this way states that, when
two substances have different attributes the conception
of one does not involve the conception of the other.

Since this is precisely how Spinoza defines a substance
(

i .e

,

a substance is conceived through itself alone),

the phrase "whose attributes are different" appears to
be parenthetical.

It appears to be added because the

attributes, like a substance, are conceived without the

conception of anything else
is now clear.

.

The meaning of this phrase

To say that two substances have different

attributes means that the collection of the attributes of
each substance uniquely individuates it.

Filled out in

this way Premise 4 reads, if two substances are uniquely

individuated then the conception of one does not involve
the conception of the other.

Yet, even with this new
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understanding the phrase "whose attributes are different"
is still parenthetical.

It is still true that two sub-

stances by definition have nothing in common, if by that
is meant the conception of the one does not involve the

conception of the other.
Since Premise 4 is simply a restatement of part of

Spinoza's definition of a substance, it is subject to
the difficulties of that definition.

One cannot define

a substance, without circularity, as that which does not

involve the conception of any other substance.

The Leib-

niz objection, and the problem of circularity in the

definition persist.
Argument A.
Ethics )

Premise 2.

(proposition III,

Things which have nothing in common cannot the one be the cause of the other. 2

Spinoza's proof for this premise is layed out in

Argument D of Chapter

I

.

In addition to the information

already understood regarding what it means to say two
things have nothing in common

(

i

.

e

.

,

the conception of the

one does not involve the conception of the other), there
is the further understanding that this signifies neither

modes nor attributes are shared by these two things.
2.
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Even with a better understanding of Spinoza's key
concepts, Premise
1)

2

is unclear for the following reasons:

the referent of "things” is left unspecified; and 2)

the acceptability and interpretation of Axiom IY in

Argument D (Spinoza's proof for Premise 2), is still in
question
Premise

2

(proposition III) does not specify that

the "things” in question are substances.

As stated pre-

viously, it is possible that the things are modes.

Modes

are that which are conceived through something other

than themselves.

Understanding "things" to be modes,

and understanding "having nothing in common" to mean the

conception of the one does not involve the conception of
the other,

the premise reads:

Two things which are con-

ceived through something other than themselves (modes),

where the conception of the one does not involve the

conception of the other cannot the one cause the other.
Filling out Premise
plausible

.

2

in this way seems completely im-

There is nothing in the antecedent that pre-

cludes the one mode causing the other mode.

Understanding "things" here to mean substances, the
premise reads:

Two things which are conceived through

themselves where the conception of the one does not involve the conception of the other cannot the one cause
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the other.

This says that because a substance by defini-

tion is conceived through itself it cannot cause another
substance

.

The reason Spinoza thinks this is the case

is contained in Axioms IV and V of the Ethics

Axiom V

says that if two substances are self-conceived then the
one cannot be understood by means of the other.

This

seems true given that the conception of the one does not

involve the conception of the other.

In Axiom IV Spinoza

claims that if substance A causes substance B

f

then the

knowledge of B depends on and involves the knowledge of
But, by virtue of Spinoza's definition of a substance

A.

and Axiom V, knowledge of B cannot depend on and involve
knowledge of A

.

If we grant the truth of Axiom IV

(knowledge of an effect depends on knowledge of its

cause) and accept Spinoza's definition of a substance,

then one substance cannot cause another substance

.

The

problems with Spinoza's definition of a substance have
The interpretation of Axiom IV, and

already been given.

its acceptability, is still a matter of question.

If we

understand Spinoza to claim that we cannot in any sense

know the effect of some cause without knowing the cause,
then his claim is false.

If his claim is rather that we

cannot have full knowledge of an effect without knowing

3

.
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its cause,

then he must tell us what is meant by full

knowledge of the effect, and show how a criterion as
strict as this does not prevent us from ever knowing

anything.

Premise

2,

therefore, depending as it does

on the claim that knowledge of an effect depends on

and involves knowledge of its cause, seems unacceptable.

Argument A.
Ethics )

Premise 6.

(proposition

V,

There cannot exist in the universe two
or more substances having the same nature or attribute

This premise can now be examined in light of the

discussion of "attribute" and "essence" in Chapters II
and III.

The evaluation of Premise 6 is now possible.

The only problem with this premise is the proof Spinoza

gives for it.

His proof does not show that two substances

cannot have the same nature or attribute

,

but rather is

a proof for the conclusion that there is only one sub-

stance

.

In this proof he claims that this premise is

so obvious it needs no further illumination ("...it will

be granted that there cannot be more than one with an

identical attribute."^).

Its obviousness is now evident.

Spinoza is not claiming that two or more substances
cannot share the same essential property, that is, he is
43
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not claiming that they cannot have an attribute in common.

He is claiming that two or more substances cannot

share all their attributes

distinct.

(

i .e

.

their essences), and be

,

The collection of the attributes of a substance

(its essence) is that which uniquely individuates that

substance from any other thing.

With the understanding

of "same nature or attribute" as that which uniquely in-

dividuates whatever has it, it is obviously true by
Leibniz' Law that no two substances (or no two things
for that matter) can share all their properties and be

distinct

Argument B is a second argument Spinoza puts forth
in support of the conclusion that one substance cannot
be produced by another substance

.

Premises

2

and 4 are

Both have been encountered and dis-

the most significant.

cussed in connection with Argument A.
Premise 2.

Argument B.
Ethics )

(Axiom IV,

The knowledge of an effect depends on
and involves the knowledge of a cause

This premise appeared in Argument D,

Premise

2

of Argument A.

.°

in support of

It is subject to the same

difficulties mentioned there.

The claim is either false

or has such a strict application that knowledge of any-

thing seems impossible
Spinoza, Ethics

,
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Argument B. Premise 4.
iii Ethics )

(definition

,

Substance is that which is in itself
and conceived through itself; in other
words, that of which a conception can
be formed independently of any other
conception
.

This is Spinoza's definition of substance, and is

carefully examined in Chapter IV.

The first part of

the definition refers to the idea that a substance is

capable of independent existence.

thing in order to exist.)
this:

(It needs no other

Two problems persist with

1) It seems that a substance cannot exist without

its attributes, making independent existence questiona-

ble; and 2) the definition is circular, since when it is

asked what a substance with its attributes is independent
of,

the answer is another substance with its attributes.
The second part of Spinoza's definition (conceived

through itself) is subject to the problem raised by
Leibniz

.

In order to conceive substance it is necessary

to conceive the attributes of substance, and hence the

claim (that a substance is conceived through itself
alone) is false.

Arguments A and B in support of the conclusion that
one substance cannot produce or cause another substance

7.
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fail

support that conclusion.

"to

It has heen found that

the crucial premises in "both arguments are problematic.

Argument

C

is Spinoza's main argument for the con-

clusion that there cannot he two self-caused substances
Premises
Premise
infinite

2,

4 and 6 are crucial in this argument.

2

Spinoza says that every substance is necessarily

.

In Premise 4 he asserts that anything which has

infinite reality must have infinite attributes.
mise

In

6 he

In Pre-

claims that the possession of infinite attri-

butes entails the possession of all possible attributes.

All of these premises are closely related.

A discussion

of any one of these premises leads to a discussion of the

other two.

The important questions raised by these pre-

mises are the following:
the term "infinite"?

In what sense does Spinoza use

Is his notion of infinity a plausi-

ble one?

Consider Spinoza's use of the term "infinite" in
Premise

2

(proposition VIII) of Argument C:

stance is necessarily infinite."
mise is

g

The proof for this pre-

:

There can only be one substance with
an identical attribute, and existence
follows from its nature (prop, vii )
its nature, therefore, involves
existence, either as finite or
.

8.
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infinite
It does not exist as finite for (by def. ii ) it would
then be limited by something else
of the same kind which would also
necessarily exist (prop, vii.);
and there would be two substances
with an identical attribute, which
is absurd (prop. v.).
It therefore
exists as infinite .9
.

,

.

On the basis of this proof, it seems that for Spinoza a

substance is infinite if it is unlimited, that is, if it
is not limited by something else of the same kind.

There-

fore, a substance or God is infinite if it is not limited

by another substance or God.

In the above proof Spinoza

speaks of the finite as something limited, and tells us
that in the case of substance this is "absurd"--a sub-

stance cannot be limited by something else of the same
kind.

This is precisely how G. Parkinson interprets

Spinoza's use of the term "infinite" in Premise

sition VIII).

2

(propo-

Parkinson states that, "The first argument

...which says that every substance is necessarily infinite,
is actually to show that every substance is what Spinoza

calls 'infinite in its own kind'."

10

Although the proof

to Premise 2 does provide a strong reason for believing

with Parkinson that Spinoza has the meaning of "infinite
9-

10

.
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i ub

kind.

(

i

-

6

,

unlimited) in mind in

"this

premise,

there are stronger reasons for another interpretation.
If one returns to Spinoza's definition of God

(definition vi

)

,

it can be seen that he has two different

senses of the term "infinite"

By God, I mean a being absolutely
inf inite--that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of
which each expresses eternal and
infinite essentiality.
I say absolutely infinite, not infinite
after its kind: for, of a thing
infinite only after its kind, infinite attributes may be denied;
but that which is absolutely infinite contains in its essence whatever expresses reality...
,

There is for Spinoza the absolutely infinite or God (sense
1),

and the contrasted infinite in its kind (sense 2).

Spinoza defines a thing that is absolutely infinite as a
thing which has an infinite number of attributes, that is,
a being which possesses all possible reality.
A thing which is infinite in its own kind is a thing

of which "infinite attributes may be denied"

.

Spinoza has

no further explanation for what it is to be infinite in its

own kind.

He does, however, say what it means for a thing

to be finite after its kind and it seems reasonable to ex-

pect that infinite after its kind signifies just the opposite.
11.
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Something is finite after its kind when it "...can be
limited by another thing of the same nature."'12

Some-

thing, then, would be infinite after its own kind when
it cannot be limited by another thing of the same nature

Hence, infinite in its own kind seems to mean unlimited.
It is my view that Spinoza means by infinite in

Premise

the absolutely infinite (sense 1), not as

2,

Parkinson suggests, the infinite in its own kind (sense
2).

I

hold this view for the following reasons:

To begin,

I

agree with Wolfson that propositions

VIII and IX must be seen together as premises for the

conclusion that substance possesses an infinite number of
attributes.

13

Spinoza's argument is:

necessarily infinite

(

i .e

,

Every substance is

possesses infinite reality or

The more reality or being a thing has,

being).

the number of its attributes (proposition IX).

substance possesses infinite attributes
al reasons why
Wolfson'

s

I

.

the greater

Therefore,

There are sever-

feel this particular interpretation of

is correct.

Spinoza's order of presentation in-

dicates that proposition VIII should not be viewed as an

isolated proposition.

The argument is very neatly presented

in order in propositions VIII, IX and X.

12

.

13.
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In proposition VIII
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Spinoza says that every substance is necessarily
infinite.

In proposition IX he says that the more

reality a thing has the more attributes it possesses.
And at the end of the note to proposition X Spinoza asserts that,

"Consequently it is abundantly clear, that an

absolutely infinite being must necessarily be defined as
consisting

m

infinite attributes..." 14

If one sees the

relationship between these three premises, one must arrive at the conclusion that "infinite" in Premise

2

means

absolutely infinite, not infinite in its kind.
Second, there is no reason to suppose that when

Spinoza speaks of things that are infinite in their kind
he is referring to substances.

More likely, he has in

mind things like attributes, which are also infinite (not
absolutely, but rather in their own kind).

When referring

clearly the infinity Spinoza has in mind

to substances,

is that of the absolutely infinite.

Support for this

interpretation is Spinoza's use of the terms "God" and
"substance" interchangeably.

For Spinoza, whatever is

true of God is true of substance.

God, as we have seen,

is defined as the absolutely infinite, not the infinite

in its kind.

Therefore, substance must also be the abso-

lutely infinite
l4

.
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Third, Argument C, Spinoza's principal argument to

show that there cannot be two self-caused substances, does

not make sense when "infinite” in Premise
finite in its own kind.

2

is read as in-

The argument depends upon our

understanding "infinite" to mean absolutely infinite.
Spinoza's argument in

C is

that there cannot be two sub-

stances, because if there were they would have to share
the same attribute

.

They must share the same attribute

because a substance is infinite, that is, it possesses

all possible attributes.
attribute

,

A substance has every possible

and hence if there were two substances their

attributes would have to overlap.
2

If one reads Premise

as "infinite in its kind," Spinoza has no argument for

the conclusion that there cannot be two infinite substances.
In Spinoza's system it is possible to have two infinite

substances, if by infinite one means infinite after their

own kind.

Parkinson is wrong to read Premise

2

as an ar-

gument designed to show that every substance is "infinite
after its own kind."

With this understanding of Premise
easily understood.

2,

Premise 4 is

Premise 4 is simply a restatement of

Spinoza's view that an infinite substance is one which
has an infinite number of attributes.

What is said in

Premise 4 (proposition IX) has already been given in
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Spinoza's definition of God.

Premise

6

fills out what

Spinoza means by an infinite number of attributes:
means an exhaustive number of attributes

For Spinoza

.

there can only be one infinity of attributes

sessed by the one substance, God.

He

— that

pos-

Substance must contain

in its essence whatever expresses reality.

This precludes

there being more than one substance
One thing seems clear--Spinoza has a false notion
of infinity.

He cannot conceive of two infinite things,

each with an infinite number of members, yet neither

having any members in common with each other.

If two

things have an infinite number of members, then, for
One counter-

Spinoza, their members must be the same.

example to Spinoza is as follows:

number of integers from

2

There is an infinite

to infinity.

infinite number of real numbers between

There is also an
0

Both

and 1.

of these sets have an infinite number of members, yet

no member of the one set is a member of the other.

Spino-

za holds that only those things are infinite which are in-

capable of further increase

adjoined or added.

,

or to which nothing can be

Modern construals of infinity lay

emphasis on the perpetual capability of increase

.

Those

things are infinite which are always capable of further

increase.

As Bolzano points out, Spinoza's definition of
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infinity is too narrow.

Bolzano states:

One can add quantities to any quantity
whatsoever even to one infinitely great
.and those added quantities can already he themselves infinite ....
.

.

What mathematician is there who, if
he allows infinity of any kind, is
not forced to concede that the length
of a straight line hounded on one side
but stretching to infinity on the other
is infinitely great and nevertheless
capable of being increased on the side
hitherto limited. 15
Therefore, Argument

C

(Spinoza's argument for the conclu-

sion that there cannot be two self-caused infinite substances), is unacceptable due to his false notion of

infinity
Closing Remarks
By careful examination it has been found that most
of Spinoza's arguments for the claim that there is only

one substance in the university are either problematic or

defective.

The main obstacle to Spinoza's claim is not

what is commonly thought, that is, the De Vries problem,
but rather the arguments themselves.

All the arguments

examined have been found to include very problematic
premises.

Spinoza is unable to satisfactorily prove

either that, l) one substance cannot be produced by another
15.

Bolzano, Paradoxes of the Infinite (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 195°) 82.
B.

»
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suostance, or 2) that there cannot be two self-caused infinite substances-

.since

both of these claims are neces —

sary to establish proposition XIV, he is unable to support
this proposition.

Although Spinoza's arguments for the

thesis that there is only one substance are not as ob-

vious as the emperor's new clothes, they are equally

inadequate

.
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